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I. INTRODUCTION:
VIRGINITY TESTING IN THE BATTLE AGAINST AIDS
People say to me, ‘Why, why are you doing this?’ And I say to them, ‘What have you done to stop AIDS,
to limit abortion? . . . We are going ahead with our virginity testing because we have nothing else.1
Nomagugu Ngobese, tester and traditional healer

Thousands of South African children are being examined to ensure that they have preserved what
many view as one of the country’s greatest defenses against the HIV/AIDS pandemic—their virginity.2
South Africa is presently experiencing an explosive AIDS crisis and is among the world’s worst affected
countries.3 In many communities, each virgin is seen as another small victory in South Africa’s battle
with a virus that has by some estimates infected approximately 5.5 million of the country’s 47 million
people.4 South Africa has among the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world,
second only to India which now has 5.7 million people infected.5 South Africa now has the sixth highest
∗
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Suzanne Daley, How South Africans Screen Girls for Abstinence, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999.
2
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prevalence rate in the world.6 South Africa is widely regarded as having one of the most severe HIV
epidemics in the world. 7
Young women are particularly vulnerable.8 The infection rate for young women is far higher than
the rates for young men in Africa.9 Females aged 15–24 are four times more likely to be infected with
HIV than men in that same age group.10 In South Africa, a disproportionate share of those infected and
affected by HIV/AIDS are women and girls,11 with females estimated to comprise 58 percent of the HIV
positive population.12 UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, has identified South
Africa as the country with the highest number of women infected with HIV/AIDS in the world.13 South
Africa has almost double the number of HIV infected women as India and over triple that of neighboring
Zimbabwe.14
South African mortality rates are rising sharply as a result of the AIDS pandemic. The mortality rate
for young South African women aged 25–29 in 1999–2000 was 3.5 times higher than in 1985.15 In 2005,
of the adult deaths aged 15–49, approximately 45–53 percent were believed due to HIV/AIDS.16 Average
life expectancy has also been significantly reduced by the pandemic.17 According to the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the life expectancy from birth of a South African was down from 62 years in

6

http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/2006GR-PrevalenceMap_en.pdf . The five others are
Swaziland (33.4%), Botswana (24.1%), Lesotho (23.2%), Zimbabwe (20.1%), and Namibia (19.6%).
7
http://www.aids.org.za/hiv.htm; see also UNAIDS, 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC,
at http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/south+africa.asp.
8
A child born in the worst affected countries between 2005 and 2010 can expect to die before his or her
fortieth birthday. TONY BARNETT & ALAN WHITESIDE, AIDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISEASE AND
GLOBALIZATION 22–23 (2002). For a discussion of the challenges AIDS-Affected children in Africa confront; see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: HIV/AIDS AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN KENYA (2001).
9
BARNETT & WHITESIDE, supra note 8, at 10–11.
10
Id.
11
UNAIDS: http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/04-Sub_Saharan_Africa_2006_EpiUpdate_eng.pdf
12
UNAIDS/WHO Epidemiological Facts Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections: South
Africa (2006) (Among the 5.5 million South African adults infected, 3.1 million are women.)
13
UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, brings together the efforts and resources of
ten United Nations system organizations to the global AIDS response. Based in Geneva, the UNAIDS secretariat
works on the ground in more than 75 countries world wide.
14
UNAIDS: http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/2006_GR_ANN2_en.pdf. At the end of 2005, it
was estimated that South Africa had 3.1 million women infected with HIV/AIDS, compared with 1.6 million in
India and 890,000 in Zimbabwe. Id.
15
Alan Whiteside et al., Through a Glass, Darkly: Data and Uncertainty in the AIDS Debate in ETHICS &
AIDS IN AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE TO OUR THINKING 27 (Anton A. van Niekerk & Loretta M. Kopelman eds.,
2005); The death rate among women aged 30–34 because 4.6 times as high as it was seven years earlier jumping to
23 per 1,000. Michael Wines, AIDS Cited in the Climb in South Africa’s Death Rate, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2006).
16
http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/86/data. The estimated number of AIDS deaths in South Africa during
2005 exceeded 320,000.UNAIDS/WHO Epidemiological Facts Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted
Infections: South Africa (2006)
17
UNICEF: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/southafrica_statistics.html. A child born in the worst affected
countries between 2005 and 2010 can expect to die before his or her fortieth birthday. BARNETT & WHITESIDE,
supra note 8, at 22–23 (2002). For a discussion of the challenges AIDS-Affected children in Africa confront; see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: HIV/AIDS AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN KENYA (2001).

2

2007]

VIRGINITY TESTING, RIGHTS AND CULTURE

3

1990 to 46 years in 2005.18 Many South African youth do not know that they are infected and are unaware
that they can transmit the virus to others.19
As a result of the devastation brought by the pandemic, virginity testing enjoys the distinction of
being among the most popular—and politically charged—public health initiatives in South Africa’s battle
with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.20 While virginity testing was a prenuptial custom previously associated
with marriage; proponents of testing now maintain that, with its emphasis on total abstinence from sexual
intercourse by girls, the practice is being revived to prevent HIV infection and AIDS. Public labeling of
girls as virgins is not without danger. Some South African researchers attribute the increase in sexual
violence against very young girls presumed virgins to a belief gaining credence in some communities that
sexual intercourse with a virgin can “cleanse” HIV-positive men or men with AIDS of disease. 21 By
2008, it is expected that children’s rights legislation currently under consideration in South Africa’s
Parliament will prohibit virginity testing for children below 16 years of age.
The resurgence and recent expansion of virginity testing—a cultural practice that disproportionately
impacts young unmarried women and girls—presents a dilemma for South Africa’s pluralistic society.
The South African government is a new constitutional democracy committed to both equality and the
preservation of the customs and traditional practices of its many different cultures. Although there are
obligations to protect, promote, and preserve equality enshrined in the South African Constitution and in
the international human rights treaty obligations that have been assumed by the government since the
nation’s transition to democracy, there are also constitutional commitments to cultural rights as well as
widespread norms that coexist in the country which are on occasion at variance with gender equality. As
such, South Africa has the difficult task of balancing cultural rights with other human rights. This will
remain a persistent challenge in post-Apartheid South Africa, compounded by the country’s context of
inadequate economic resources, fragile legal enforcement mechanisms, and an explosive HIV/AIDS
pandemic. The virginity testing debate as it has been engaged in South Africa exposes the persistent
theoretical and practical tensions between human rights universalism and cultural relativism. In this
respect, the debate over virginity testing is not unlike women’s rights struggles elsewhere in the world.
Yet, in other respects the struggle over virginity testing is unique in that it promotes a return to traditional
culture as a public health prevention measure.
The debates on virginity testing have been simultaneously engaging and impoverished highlighting
the limitations of prevalent conceptions of rights as rigid, culture as static, and gender equality as
conflicting with cultural autonomy. The arguments advanced by testing abolitionists are flawed for failing
to appreciate the opportunities that culture may present for change. The arguments advanced by those
who maintain that testing should be accepted and accommodated unchanged simply ignore the empirical
18

Id. For the first time, deaths among people in their thirties or forties have exceeded those of people in their
sixties or seventies. Michael Specter, The Denialists; the Dangerous Attacks on the Consensus about HIV and AIDS,
THE NEW YORKER, March 12, 2007.
19
See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/africa/hiv_summary_africa.pdf , page 2.
Approximately two million South Africans living with HIV do not know that they are infected. Id.
20
Singer, supra note 2; Steven Ntuli, Virginity Testing A Celebration for Some, Concern for Others Maleane,
http://www.lowveldinfo.com/news/showstory.asp?story=2725, accessed July 31, 2003.
21
Prega Govender, Child Rape: A Taboo Within the Aids Taboo, SUNDAY TIMES, April 4, 1999; Jean Redpath,
Children at Risk, Focus, June 2000. www.hsf.org.za. (“It’s such a sensitive issue with potentially racist overtones
people don’t want to confront the issue.”). For a discussion on the role of traditional healers in Africa generally and
their role in society see Dennis A. Ityavyar, Health in Pre-colonial Africa, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH
IN AFRICA 35 (Toyin Folola & Dennis Ityavyar eds. 1992)
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fact that testing practices have indeed changed over time. The common and disappointing feature shared
by both sides of the debate has been their tendency to see virginity testing itself as the problem and to
frame the possible solutions as either abolition or accommodation of the practice.
In South Africa, the domain of concern needs to be wider than legislative efforts to eradicate
virginity testing. Even if virginity testing is effectively abolished by the legislative prohibition, society
will still need to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its disproportionate impact on women. What must
be recognized is the need to expand the domain of concern beyond abolishing or accommodating virginity
testing to alter the broader cultural norms that foster HIV infection and women’s inequality in society
which served to motivate the testing resurgence in the first instance.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has given rise to a remarkable array of ethical problems and human rights
issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. 22 While the virginity testing phenomenon may initially in
itself appear to be the central rights violation at issue, a broader vision of human rights reveals the
practice for what it is—a symptom of the challenges confronting a developing nation dealing with
pandemic disease. Understood in this light, as a public health measure, the virginity testing phenomenon
presents two distinct challenges for human rights discourse. First, it highlights the persistent divisions
between the competing normative orders of rights universalism and rights relativism. Second, the relative
silence about the unrealized right to health in the debates about the testing ban speaks to the difficulty
human rights discourse continues to have in dealing with issues concerning economic, social and cultural
rights.
This Article explores the tension between the rights of women and girls to equality, privacy, and
sexual autonomy and the politics of culture in the context of pandemic disease. Specifically, this article
examines the political debate surrounding the resurgence of virginity testing and its widespread popular
support and the South African government’s recent prohibition of the practice. This article argues that the
current debate on virginity testing which focuses on abolition or accommodation of the practice is
misguided and polarizing, and increases the likelihood that the problem driving the testing resurgence—
high rates of HIV infection which disproportionately impacts women and girls—will remain unresolved.
Recognizing that recent bans on virginity testing will not effectively end testing, just as virginity testing
will not end the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the article calls for a discursive shift in the debate.
Rather than focusing on an assumed inherent conflict between gender equality and cultural autonomy
there should be an engaged public discourse on the right to health and the ethical obligation of
government to, at a minimum, provide accurate health information and adequate health services in a
manner sensitive to and respectful of cultural differences. Such a shift would cause the government and
civil society to recognize that legal and medical approaches cannot in isolation sufficiently improve
public health—it is necessary to acknowledge and embrace cultural norms while at the same time
recognizing that such norms must evolve over time to accommodate contemporary lifestyles and trends.
Part II of the Article explains the virginity testing procedure, tracks its revival, and discusses
complications and concerns associated with testing. Part III situates virginity testing within the human
rights literature on gender equality and cultural self-determination, discusses the rights based arguments
advanced by both opponents and proponents of the practice and the pertinent provisions of international
human rights instruments and the South African Constitution. Part IV reviews the limits of the legislative
battle lines drawn between gender equality and cultural practices and explains the shortcomings of the
arguments advanced by both sides. It is argued that stakeholders in the virginity testing legislative battle
22

See, e.g., Anton A. van Niekerk, Moral and Social Complexities of AIDS in Africa in ETHICS & AIDS IN
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have drawn the wrong battle lines by failing to focus more fully on the unrealized right to health. Part V
offers that the divergent positions taken by stakeholders in the testing debate can be reconciled through
not only the discursive shift towards a substantive right to health; but also a pragmatic approach to
cultural pluralism and an understanding of both rights and culture as contextual and adaptable. It is also
argued that both these approaches could be enhanced by a human rights discourse informed by
“capabilities theory” which through its appreciation of diversity and emphasis on positive freedoms
would redirect the focus of government and civil society efforts on the underlying issues surfaced by the
virginity testing resurgence.23 Finally, the Article briefly concludes noting that the resurgence in virginity
testing as a community self-help solution signals a systemic failure on the part of the South African
government and the international community to adequately address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It observes
that virginity testing is illustrative of how human rights discourse raises problems that are practical and
urgent on one hand and theoretical and abstract on the other. The Article offers a pragmatic approach to
address the practical problems of cultural pluralism in diverse developing countries and advances
capabilities theory as a way to address the theoretical difficulty socioeconomic rights present to human
rights discourse.
II. VIRGIN TERRITORY:
TEST REVIVAL AND SOUTH AFRICA’S PROBLEMATIC AIDS POLICIES
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the AIDS issue in South Africa has been highly politicized and
racially charged.24 Although there have recently been some improvements in the government’s AIDS
policies, several international commentators have described President Thabo Mbeki’s early denial of a
link between HIV and AIDS as “irresponsibility bordering on criminality.”25 Others have suggested that
the government’s stance created confusion among the public and fostered a climate of misinformation that
was “genocidal” in its effect.26
In 2000, South African President Thabo Mbeki came under fierce international criticism from
mainstream scientists and medical experts after appointing an international advisory panel of AIDS

23

Originally conceived as a challenge to classical development economics by Nobel Laureate in Economics,
Amartya Sen, and expanded by legal philosopher Martha Nussbaum, capabilities theory maintains normatively that
economic, political, legal and other social policies should be evaluated according to how they expand people’s
capabilities to achieve freedom to function in ways they find valuable. See generally AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED (1999); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
(2000).
24
VIRGINIA VAN DER VLIET, THE POLITICS OF AIDS 49–50 (1996) (“right-wing politicians used the threat of an
epidemic in the black community to stir up racial prejudice, win political support and demand renewed segregation,
by suggesting that AIDS could be passed on in social or physical contact in desegregated facilities such as schools,
hospitals and swimming pools.”)
25
Green Left Online, South Africa: Mbeki’s AIDS Stance Slammed (July 26, 2000), at
http://www.greenleft.org.au/2000/413/23244; see also BARNETT & WHITESIDE, DISEASE AND GLOBALIZATION,
supra note 8, at 298.
26
Id., see also Michael Specter, The Denialists: The Dangerous Attacks on the Consensus about HIV and
AIDS, THE NEW YORKER, March 12, 2007 (quoting a leading AIDS expert referring to promotion of dissident AIDS
science as “murder”).
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experts and scientists which included a small group of dissident scientists who maintained that HIV is not
the cause of AIDS.27 Mbeki refused to accept that HIV causes AIDS and expressed this view publicly.28
At the opening ceremonies of the 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban South Africa in
July 2000, President Mbeki blamed poverty and poor nutrition, not HIV, as the primary causes of AIDS
in South Africa.29 He demanded that policy priorities be directed towards poverty generally, rather than
AIDS specifically.30 He referred to AIDS as a “catch-all” categorical term associated with other diseases
like malaria and tuberculosis.31 President Mbeki also claimed that antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) potentially
do more harm than good asserting that ARVs “ineffective” and “toxic” and suggested that foreign drug
companies exaggerated the efficacy of ARVs to maximize profits.32 Initially, the government refused to
supply ARVs to pregnant women to reduce the risk of transmission of the virus from mother to child.33 It
was not until after a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the government to act, Minister of Health v.
Treatment Action Campaign, that the government made ARVs widely available to pregnant women
throughout the country.34
In September 2001, President Mbeki began to question the country’s mortality data and to minimize
the magnitude of the HIV epidemic as reported by international community observers.35 Only one cabinet
minister from the ANC, Labor Minister Membathisi Mdladlana, publicly declared that HIV causes AIDS

27

BBC News, Mbeki Digs In On AIDS, Sept. 20, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/934435.stm
28
Id. For Mbeki’s response to condemnation of his AIDS policy as a “criminal abandonment of the fight
against HIV/AIDS,” see his editorial commentary, Thabo Mbeki, Reciting Comfortable Catechisms on AIDS is not
Good Enough, THE SUNDAY TIMES, April 23, 2000; see also Chasing the Rainbow: A Survey of South Africa, THE
ECONOMIST, April 8, 2006 (positing “Mbeki’s unorthodox views on the causes and cures of HIV/AIDS undoubtedly
have something to do with his agenda of finding African solutions (rather than expensive Western ones) to Africa’s
problems…).
29
CNN.com, Mandela Repudiates Mbeki on AIDS Stance, Sept. 29 2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/09/29/safrica.mandela.reut/index.html.
30
Patrick Bond, A Political Economy of South African AIDS, http://www.zmag.org/bondsa aids.htm.
31
Green Left Online, South Africa: Mbeki’s AIDS Stance Slammed (July 26, 2000), at
http://www.greenleft.org.au/2000/413/23244
32
Id.
33
BBC News, Mbeki Digs In On AIDS, Sept. 20, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/934435.stm
34
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign CCT8/02 (declaring that the Constitution requires the
government to devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated program to
realize progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to health services to
combat mother–to–child transmission of HIV)
35
Schneider, Helen; Fassin, Didier (2002). “Denial and defiance: a socio-political analysis of AIDS in South
Africa.” AIDS, Supplement 16 (Supplement 4): S45–S51, available at
http://www.aidsonline.com/pt/re/aids/pdfhandler.00002030-200216004-00007.pdf.; see also Mbeki in Bizarre AIDS
Outburst, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Oct. 26–Nov. 1(2001) (reporting on an address by Mbeki at the University of Fort
Hare and attributing to him the following comments: “others who consider themselves to be our leaders take to the
streets carrying their placards, to demand that because we are germ carriers, and human beings of a lower order that
cannot subject its passions to reason . . . convinced that we are but natural-born promiscuous carriers of germs,
unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our
unconquerable devotion to sin and lust.”)
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during Mbeki’s efforts to deny the connection.36 Finally in August 2003, the cabinet, who can override
presidential decisions in the South African system, declared HIV to be the cause of AIDS.37 Responding
to repeated accusations of failing to adequately address to the AIDS epidemic, eventually Mbeki stated
that although he was not convinced that the link between HIV and AIDS was conclusively established, his
government would remain committed to fighting the disease.38
The government has to date demonstrated its commitment in a bizarre manner. For example,
Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who has served since June of 1999, promoted nutritional
approaches to AIDS while highlighting potential toxicities of ARVs and the claim that they might even
cause AIDS.39 She also voiced support for the Dr. Rath Health Foundation, an organization that promoted
vitamin supplements as a substitute for ARVs.40 Finally, in August 2005, South Africa’s Advertising
Standards Authority ruled that such statements were a threat to public health.41
In September 2006, the Minister of Health was sidelined, although not removed,42 after repeatedly
questioning the efficacy of ARVs and instead promoting the use of garlic, lemon, beetroot and African
potatoes as a more effective way of treating AIDS.43 South Africa came under severe criticism recently at
the 19th international AIDS conference in Toronto in 2006 after Dr. Tshabalala-Msimang openly said that
these methods were preferable to ARVs.44 International scientists attending the conference called the
South African government’s policies “disastrous [and] pseudo-scientific.”45 At this writing, however, the

36

CNN.com, Mandela Repudiates Mbeki on AIDS Stance, Sept. 29 2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/09/29/safrica.mandela.reut/index.html.
37
Human Rights Watch, Deadly Delay: South Africa’s Efforts To Prevent HIV in Survivors of Sexual
Violence 24 (March 2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/southafrica0304/southafrica0304.pdf.
38
BBC News, Controversy Dogs AIDS Forum (July 10, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/826742.stm.
Mbeki’s denials led 5000 leading scientists from around the world to sign the “Durban Declaration” which insisted
that “[t]he scientific evidence that HIV causes AIDS is unambiguous.” Green Left Online, South Africa: Mbeki’s
AIDS Stance Slammed (July 26, 2000), at http://www.greenleft.org.au/2000/413/23244;
39
Basildon Peta, Mbeki Demotes AIDS Minister Who Urged ‘Garlic’ Treatment, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 9,
2006), available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article1431071.ece.
40
Avert, HIV & AIDS in South Africa, http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm; see Sarah Boseley,
Discredited Doctor’s ‘Cure’ For AIDS Ignites Life-And-Death Struggle in South Africa, THE GUARDIAN (May 14,
2005), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,1483821,00.html.
41
Avert, HIV & AIDS in South Africa, http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm;
42
Msimang was replaced by an interim director Feb. 28, 2007 due to health complications associated with an
undisclosed illness, not because of her principles and position on HIV/AIDS. See, Ailing Manto Put On Sick Leave
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=300374&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/.
Transport Minister Jeff Radebe has been appointed interim health minister. South African officals have not said
whether Msimang will return to the post. Craig Timberg, South Africa Replaces Health Minister, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 28, 2007.
43
Basildon Peta, Mbeki Demotes AIDS Minister Who Urged ‘Garlic’ Treatment, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 9,
2006), available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article1431071.ece.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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South African government has recently released a new HIV/AIDS policy document that has to date been
well received by civil society HIV/AIDS advocates.46
In sum, for long while, the South African government has proved unwilling or unable to effectively
meet the challenges presented by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Meanwhile, the brunt of the illiberal self-help
solutions that have arisen to fill this governance gap in addressing HIV/AIDS, such as virginity testing, is
being borne by the least powerful members of South African society. It is within this context that the
practice of virginity testing has re-emerged, advanced by its proponents as both a return to African
tradition and an HIV/AIDS prevention strategy in a country ravaged by the disease.
A. Origins and Evolution of Virginity Testing
Three years ago if you had talked about virginity testing people would laugh and say that was
something that their grannies did. But it’s really a growing phenomenon now. This year it is
bigger than last year and next year it will be even bigger again.47
Futhi Zilkala, Commission for Gender Equality
In general, virginity testing refers to the exercise of examining young women and girls to ascertain
whether or not they are sexually chaste.48 The testing tradition among Zulus was originally intended to
assure the purity of young brides who were required to prove their chastity before their parents and future
in-laws settled on an amount to be transferred by the groom’s family to the bride’s family (Ilobolo).49
Virginity testing apparently fell into disuse when migrant labor and forced migration eroded family
structures.50
While there is a general consensus that virginity testing was rather widely conducted in the past,
presently, there is uncertainty regarding its frequency and the manner in which tests were conducted.51
There is also general agreement that chastity before marriage was greatly valued and socially regulated in
traditional cultures.52 In particular, differential ilobolo amounts demonstrate the importance placed on a
46

Amy Musgrave, New AIDS Plan Needs Business Help, BUSINESS DAY, March 15, 2007; Charlene HunterGault, New Policy on AIDS, National Public Radio Morning Edition Broadcast, March 14, 2007; Craig Timberg, In
South Africa, A Dramatic Shift on AIDS, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 27, 2006.
47
Daley, supra note 1.
48
Susan LeClerc-Madlala, Virginity Testing: Managing Sexuality in a Maturing HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 15
MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY QUARTERLY (2001). It should be noted that virginity testing in neither a recent
phenomenon nor an exclusively African practice. Indeed, the condition of virginity has been contested throughout
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is ostensibly tested and concluding: “The gendered nature of virginity has been an inescapable feature of Western
discourses on the body for more than two thousand years. How one goes about defining and verifying virginity may
change over time, but the general belief that the body is readable, and virginity is verifiable, has remained fairly
consistent.”); see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A MATTER OF POWER: STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN’S VIRGINITY IN
TURKEY (1994) (virginity testing in Turkey); Fungai Machirori, Virginity Tests Unjust, The Herald (Harare) Jan. 19,
2007 (virginity testing in Zimbabwe).
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girl’s virginity at marriage.53 The main exchange commodity in the ilobolo transactions were cattle.54 If
the potential bride was found to be a virgin after testing, the standard ten head of cattle could be
supplemented by an additional head.55 This additional cow was known as inkomo kamama, or mother’s
cow, and was given to the girl’s mother as a token of gratitude from the future groom’s family for
providing them with a “pure” bride.56 The responsibility for examining a young woman to establish her
chaste status prior to a marriage is believed to have belonged to the elderly female relatives of the girl’s
family with the prospective groom’s mother as a witness.57
Whether or not girls eligible for marriage were historically subjected to public, collective, routine
inspections absent an engagement or marriage proposal, as practiced today, remains an open question. 58
There is minimal ethnographic evidence to support assertions about testing frequency.59 Nevertheless,
other forms of social control likely helped to instill the value of premarital chastity. For example, talking
to girls about the importance of maintaining virginity before marriage formed part of the traditional
puberty ritual known as umhlonyane.60 Ideally, virginity testing “coincided with the commencement of a
girl’s first menses and was marked by her seclusion and instruction by elderly women in how to sit
properly and generally how to conduct herself with modesty and dignity.”61
In contrast to what is known of the virginity testing that occurred in the past, contemporary virginity
testing takes place in a wide variety of settings that range from the privacy of the family home, to the
kraal of a village chief, to school halls, to community centers and even large public sports stadiums.62
Virginity tests today are often conducted in connection with a three-day festival and ritual of appeasement
dedicated to Nomkhubulwana, a goddess once prominent in Zulu cosmology.63 The three-day rite
culminates in a celebratory sowing of seeds in a garden, the tradition that only virgins may perform this
task is offered as a justification for testing.64
53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
54

56
57

58

Id.
Id.
60
Id.

Id. (Significantly, female genitalia are also referred to as inkomo kamama.)
Id.

59
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Id.
Fiona Scorgie, Virginity Testing and the Politics of Sexual Responsibility, 61 AFRICAN STUDIES 1 (2002)
(citing M. Kohler, Marriage Customs in Southern Natal. Ethnological Publications, 4 Department of Native Affairs,
Pretoria (1933); Gluckman, M. Zulu Women in Hoecultural Ritual, 9 Bantu Studies 255–71 (1935); Krige, E.J. The
Social System of the Zulus (1936); Van der Vliet, V. Growing up in Traditional Society in Hammond-Tooke, W.D.
(ed) The Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa (1974))
63
Scorgie at 57 (Most commentators have traced the current revival of ukuhlolwa kwezintombi or virginity
testing in KwaZulu-Natal to around 1994).
64
Scorgie at 57 (Nomkhubulwana is a female deity described as the “female principle, immortal virgin, mother
and protector of all Zulu girls and the source of growth and creation”). Virginity testing festivals are promoted by
individuals who have formed non-governmental organizations aimed at cultural preservation and fostering a return
to tradition. such as Isivivane, AmaGugu, aseAfrika, IsiggiseSintu and the All Africa Cultural Group. Presently,
cultural organizations are reportedly conducing virginity testing among Zulu girls throughout the province of
KwaZulu-Natal. See, e.g., Gabi Khumalo, The Champion of Virginity Testing, NATAL WITNESS June 26, 2003.
http://witness.co.za/content\2003_06\16334.htm.; see also LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48; see also Landiwe
Dlamini, Virginity Testing Reintroduced to Fight AIDS, SUNDAY TIMES Jan. 17, 1999.
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Formally, there is no central governmental cultural organization managing or directing virginity
testing.65 “The provincial health department of KwaZulu-Natal, while not officially advocating virginity
testing, is reported to be actively involved in assuring that proper health precautions are taken during
genital inspection by providing rubber gloves for testers and facilitating workshops to educate testers
about female reproductive anatomy.”66
B. Testing Practices and Procedures
This shows I have not been touched by evil things.67
Valentia Hlophe, age 14, virgin
Virginity assessments are derived from indigenous rather than biomedical knowledge.68 According
to South African medical anthropologist Suzanne LeClerc-Madlala, to understand virginity testing among
the Zulu, “one must be conversant in the metaphorical language used in the folk descriptions of the
human body and human bodily processes.”69 Accordingly, “biomedical ‘reality’ and scientific ‘truth’ are
of little import.”70 The qualities testers look for as evidence of virginity are derived from folk constructs
of the body and ethno-medical beliefs of health and illness.71
Members of the medical establishment have questioned whether many of the testers, often traditional
healers, are drawing accurate conclusions as there is no standard medically accepted test for virginity.
Hymens can tear accidentally and occasionally a girl may be born without one.72 Because the standards
used by testers are unscientific and are grounded in folk metaphorical conceptions of the body, the fact
that hymens can be broken during sporting activity or that there is no medically accepted screen for
virginity is of little relevance to traditional virginity testers.73 For example, testers talk about virginity
being in evidence if there is a visible “white dot” or a “white lacy barrier” somewhere deep in the vaginal
canal.74
Though the political lobby which supports testing is often skeptical of Western forms of knowledge,
some testers have borrowed some Western constructs. For example, grades such as those used to mark
examinations in schools have been incorporated into some testing practices. An “A” is earned by girls
who rate high in all assessments associated with virginity.75 She must meet a combination of criteria, the
most important relate to the genitalia, but in addition her eyes should reflect virginity in that “they look
innocent,” her breasts and abdomen should be “firm and taut,” and the muscles behind her knees should
65

LeClerc-Mandala supra 48
66
Id., see also Landiwe Dlamini, Virginity Testing Reintroduced to Fight AIDS, SUNDAY TIMES Jan. 17, 1999.
67
McGreal, supra note 50.
68
LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also CECIL G. HELMAN, CULTURE HEALTH AND ILLNESS (4th ed. 2000) (explaining how the culture
in which humans are socialized informs how people perceive and interpret changes in the body “the human body is
more than just a physical organism fluctuation between health and illness. It is also the focus of a set of beliefs about
its structure and function”);
72
Daley, supra note 1.
73
LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48
74
LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48
75
LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48
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be “tight and straight.”76 A “B” grade virgin may have had intercourse once or twice or “may have been
abused.” Active complicity in sexual intercourse may mean the difference between a “B” and a “C.”77
While the parents of a “B” grade girl will be warned to watch their daughter more closely; a “C”
grade is tantamount to failure.78 Here, no evidence of hymen is present and the girl’s eyes may indicate
she is someone “who knows men.”79 Most testers say it is useless to do anything further with these girls,
as “it is too late” and “nothing will change them.”80 A minority of testers claim that they counsel such
girls and try to impress on them the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS and pregnancy.81
Nevertheless, to receive a C is to be marked with shame and disgrace.82
Depending on the particular tester and the host or organizer of the testing event a girl’s family may
be asked to pay a fine if she fails her exam. A girl’s loss of virginity is sometimes conceived of as a
contagion that could cause other chaste girls to lose their virginity as well should they remain in close
company with her.83
Presently, testing practices vary greatly across the KwaZulu-Natal province, with testing now being
conducted on children as young as five years old in some areas. In some communities testing is
performed at home with the child inspected in the presence of her mother. The mother is then educated
and equipped with virginity testing skills where the inspection is started before the puberty stages
(ukuthomba). Testing advocates say this process better prepares the child and her mother for better
communication during puberty.84 In most communities, however, tests are still conducted in a public,
though gender segregated, forum.85
C. Popular Support for Testing, Growing Participation
Our parents encouraged us. They want us to stay virgins. People are happy about what we are
doing and they are encouraging us.86
Susan Hadebe, age 15
I think the testing is good because they must stop AIDS. A lot of teenagers don’t take care of
themselves—they don’t use condoms. And you mustn’t have sex with just anyone who doesn’t
care. But sex education could do the same thing as virginity testing. People should come and
talk about sex in the schools.87
76

LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48
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LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48.
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LeClerc-Madlala, supra note 48
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Id.
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Id.
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http://www.hst.org.za/update/44/policy4.htm (reporting that there have been unconfirmed reports of testing being
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Yvette Nhlanhla, age 18
The belief that virginity testing may provide a culturally appropriate solution to a myriad of
problems, including the AIDS epidemic, is shared across various levels of society. While virginity
testing was a prenuptial custom previously associated with marriage; proponents of testing now maintain
that, with its emphasis on total abstinence from sexual intercourse by girls, the practice is being revived:
to prevent HIV infection and AIDS, to reduce teen pregnancy, to detect incest and abuse, and to re-instill
and promote lost cultural values.88 “Many rural women, perhaps the most marginalized group in South
Africa, see virginity testing as the only way to re-instill self-respect, and pride.”89
The AIDS epidemic is stressing the extended family network as more elderly women are confronting
the prospect of caring for a growing number of grandchildren along with their sick, dying, or dead
parents.90 In addition, these grandchildren may need more care than ever before because an increasing
number of young children have contracted HIV from their infected mothers.91 Indeed, grandmothers have
become the “shock troops of the maturing AIDS epidemic, absorbing the initial social impact of AIDSrelated death and the growing problem of orphans.”92
With death rates of people between the ages of 25 to 49 believed to have increased by an estimated
161 percent between 1997 and 2004, the care-giving burden being borne in large part by elderly women is
enormous. It is therefore not surprising that the most “vociferous” advocates of reviving the testing
tradition are older women who are heads of households supporting a number of young children.93
Community youth groups are also urging their members to be tested in an effort to combat the spread
of HIV/AIDS.94 Those found chaste are rewarded with colorful certificates, praise from their parents, and
bragging rights in their communities.95 There seems to be tacit agreement that girls who are not virgins
should not take the test.96
To address claims of gender discrimination, some virginity testers have started to test boys as well.97
Critics of testing among the medical community assert that there is no scientific standard by which to
ascertain whether a girl is a virgin, let alone a boy.
There are no precise statistics on how many young women and girls participate but some
examination sites in the KwaZulu-Natal region are reportedly so crowded that hundreds of girls wait in
line for up to three hours for their turn. Virginity testing sessions are advertised on radio, and groups of

88

Virginity Testing as Cultural Practice, Proceedings of the Commission on Gender Equality’s Consultative
Conference Report (June 2000) (on file with author).
89
LeClerc-Mandala, supra note 48.
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Id.
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Id.
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95
Singer, supra note 2.
96
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97
McGreal, supra note 50; Jo Stein, Pissing in the Wind, Aug. 9, 2000 (Testing techniques include urinating in
the air, “if [urine] goes straight up in the air, the boy is a virgin. If it sprays, it means that hot sperm has come out.”);
Ajith Bridgraj, Much Ado About Virginity, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Sept. 22, 1998 (“The power with which a boy
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testers tour regional schools to spread the Zulu tradition that girls should remain virgins until marriage.98
And government officials and Zulu leaders estimate that tens of thousands are being examined each
month. Yet no one has to date conducted an official study of virginity testing’s impact on infection
rates.99
Until the Central Ministry of Education banned virginity testing on school property100 some local
teachers in rural regions of KwaZulu-Natal province had informally taken up the cause, counseling
chastity and administering virginity tests to their students in classrooms.101 For a time, virginity testing
was openly conducted with the tacit approval of the KwaZulu-Natal education department, which
encouraged testing conducted by teachers at several schools in Osizweni, an area in northern KwaZuluNatal.102 In 1998, with the support of parents and the local education superintendent, teachers in
Osizweni administered tests to more than 3,000 girls and boys some as young as six years old, and tests
were repeated as often as every three months.103 The acting principal of one school reportedly said she
supported the tests and “didn’t mind [female teacher testers] using school time or the school premises.
After all, it is for a good cause.”104 Young unmarried teachers in Osizweni were also tested.105 At the
same time however, sex education was not an option in the Osizweni schools, one teacher explained: “we
are against the use of condoms. We think condoms promote lust for sex . . . I don’t think we should teach
children about such things.”106
Although the practice is believed to have originated and remains most popular among Zulus in South
Africa, virginity testing is increasingly being used elsewhere by other communities outside of KwaZuluNatal. Eastern Cape women’s and children’s rights organizations report the use of testing among Xhosa
communities.107 In the Eastern Cape Province, where most people are of Xhosa descent, there are now
three-days of celebrations and workshops on health issues and speeches from local dignitaries organized
around the recognition of about girls who have remained virgins for two years. Girls attending were
examined by a committee of women and awarded a certificate.108
D. VIRGINITY TESTING TESTED:
DEBATING THE COMPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS
98
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100
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http://report.kff.org/archive/aids/2000/06/kh000605.4htm, accessed July 31, 2005.
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Although virginity testing in South Africa enjoys popular support as a grassroots chastity movement
it is vigorously opposed by some African feminists, AIDS activists, and many medical experts.109 These
opponents argue that the practice is unconstitutional, unhygienic, counterproductive, and potentially
dangerous in addition to violating the human rights of the children—predominantly girls—being tested.110
The concerns about virginity testing are numerous and the practice is complicated by many factors.111
1. Corruption and Commercialization
Along with the spread and popularity of virginity testing, has come commercialization and
corruption.112 Nise Malange’s research in Hlabisa among testers found that the commercialization of
African culture has moved the custom of virginity tests out of the private sphere where it once belonged
and into the public domain at the community level.113 Testing costs vary, although typically, exams cost
about 10 cents, and a certificate 90 cents.114 Aside from traditional testers, nurses at several clinics have
reportedly been charging parents a fee to conduct virginity tests on their children.115 “Among the better
known traditional testers in KwaZulu-Natal, there seems to be fair degree of rivalry and jealousy with
some testers attempting to undermine their rivals’ reputations and limit their practices.”
There have also been allegations of corruption among testers. In some instances, girls who have been
pronounced virgins have given birth a few months later, indicating that they were pregnant at the time of
the test.116 Many such “errors” have been attributed to corruption among testers.
2. Consent vs. Coercion?
Opponents argue that not only is virginity testing discriminatory and highly invasive, it is also often
involuntary. In practice, girls rarely exercise their right to refuse virginity testing because of pressure
from their family. Young women who refuse virginity testing are generally assumed to be non-virgins
which may bring shame and disgrace to the family.
There are many reports of young women and girls being forced to participate in testing.117 Opponents of
testing maintain that it is difficult to determine whether girls may opt out of testing in certain
109
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http://www.itechnology.co.za/index.php?sf=2837&art_id=qw105841331180B216&click_id=283 accessed July 31,
2003; Simpiwe Piliso, Virginity Testing Chic but Condemned, DISPATCH ONLINE, Feb. 12, 2001
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110
Virginity Testing Under Fire, News 24, July 17, 2003 www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,27-1442_1388713,00html accessed Oct. 20, 2003.
111
Cleopatra Ndlovu, Virginity Testing Raises Many Questions, Vol. 23, No. 4 FAMILY HEALTH
INTERNATIONAL (2005).
112
See, e.g., Emily Wax, Virginity Becomes a Commodity in Uganda’s War Against AIDS, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 7, 2005.
113
Ansuyah Maharaj, Virginity Testing: A Matter of Abuse or Prevention? AGENDA 41, 1999 p. 96.
114
Daley, supra note 1.
115
Prega Govender, Outcry as Nurses Cash in on Virginity Testing, SUNDAY TIMES, March 28, 1999.
116
Chastity Tests are Becoming Popular in South Africa, International Planned Parenthood Federation, June 9,
2000 http://ippfnet.ippf.org/pub/IPPF_News/News_Details.asp?ID=317 accessed July 31, 2003.
117
Dozens Tell Their Own Story of Abuse at KZN Mission. (At a Christian mission school in KwaZuluNatal, a
student complained that she and other girls at the mission school were made to sign a “true love waits” pledge
vowing not to have sex before marriage.)

14

2007]

VIRGINITY TESTING, RIGHTS AND CULTURE

15

communities, where strong parental persuasion— whether in the form or praise or punishment—amounts
to coercion absent the freedom to decline testing without social sanction. For instance, most of the girls
interviewed by researchers at a test in Mafakathini, said they had been sent by their mothers.118
3. Sexual Assault of Virgins
Public labeling of girls as virgins is not without danger. Complicating the virginity testing issue is
recent data suggesting that virgins may be more likely to be targeted for sexual assault by men who are
HIV positive.119 Some South African researchers attribute the increase in sexual violence against very
young girls presumed virgins to a belief gaining credence in some communities that sexual intercourse
with a virgin can “cleanse” HIV-positive men or men with AIDS of disease. 120 This has given rise to
fears that girls tested as virgins will be exposed to abuse by men from those communities that believe that
having sex with a virgin will cure them of AIDS.121
Virginity testing opponents and some in government blame traditional healers (sangomas) for
encouraging HIV infected men and men with AIDS to have sexual intercourse with virgins as a cure for
the disease. Traditional healers apparently believe that the disease can be cured by obtaining an infusion
of clean blood through intercourse with a virgin.122 Virgin girls are perceived as clean, dry, and
uncontaminated. Testing opponents fear that this myth is more prevalent than local authorities and AIDS
educators are willing to acknowledge.123
Researchers have noted disturbing similarities between the way in which sexually transmitted
diseases were dealt with in Europe in the last century and the manner in which AIDS is being addressed
through the virgin cure myth.124 Some scholars have suggested the belief that sexual intercourse with a
virgin can cure disease is in fact a cross-cultural myth. AIDS researchers in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria
and China have reported existence of similar misconceptions.125
Researchers also have found that younger girls are increasingly sought as sex partners by older men
as a preventive measure to avoid contracting the HIV/AIDS virus from older sexually active women who
118
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may be infected. Independent of seeking a cure for HIV, some men have indicated a preference for sex
with younger and younger girls reasoning that there is less chance that a younger and less sexually
experienced girl will be infected with HIV.126
4. Ostracism and Abuse
Girls and young women who are not deemed virgins risk being ostracized by the community. They
may be referred to as (izeqamgwaqo) or prostitutes by people in their communities.127 Depending on the
particular tester and the community, a girl’s family may be asked to pay a fine for “tainting” the
community. In those areas where chiefs host virginity testing ceremonies at their kraals, the names of
girls who have lost their virginity are given to the chief.128 Outcast socially and unmarriageable, some of
these young women eventually are forced into prostitution, placing them at even greater risk of
contracting sexually transmitted infections.129
Child abuse counselors are concerned that virginity testing may raise the threat of abuse or of
discrimination against children who fail the test. Some child advocates and woman’s rights groups have
found that the testing movement has potentially dangerous consequences and has caused hardship for
some young women. For example, social workers at Childline, a child advocacy group that offers rape
counseling in Durban and other areas, reported seeing about 40 young girls in 1999 who were brought in
by their parents after they failed the virginity tests. The parents want the girls to explain what has
happened to them and have in some cases beaten them to try to get the information. “Sometimes these
inspections destroy the child and divide the family. The children we have seen are quite frightened. There
is so much [sexual] abuse out there and often it is not the girl’s choice.”130 In one case reported to
Childline, a girl’s relatives had broken both of her arms after she failed her virginity test.131
Other children’s rights advocates have raised questions about the consequences of testing children
who are not virgins because they have been sexually abused. It is maintained that virginity testing could
contribute further to their existing and untreated trauma.132
5. Risk of Increase in Infection and Abuse
Opponents in the medical community fear that virginity testing may have the unintended effect of
increasing the risk of adolescent HIV infection because it may encourage young people to engage in even
more risky conduct. For instance, adolescents who are sexually active may engage in anal sex rather than
genital sex to avoid detection of their sexual activities given the possibility of a periodic vaginal chastity
screening.133 Opponents also question the hygiene conditions of the tests, noting for example that if one
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girl inspected has a sexually transmitted infection and unwashed hands or the same pair of gloves inspects
the rest of the line of girls then the entire group could be infected as a result of submitting to inspection.134
Child welfare advocates believe testing may serve to facilitate child abuse because children will
become confused about the rights they have over their bodies.135 As one children’s rights advocate
explained: “we are trying to teach our children, ‘your body is your body’ and then we send them to a
woman who invades it.”136 Many fear that testers are not giving sufficient consideration to the destructive
messages the exams may impart to children and adolescents about their bodies and sexuality.137
III. THE DEBATE: ABOLITION VS. ACCOMMODATION
Virginity Testing reinforces gender inequality because it reflects the attitude that women don’t
have ownership or control of their own bodies . . . we need to ask ‘is this something that leads
to the respect of women?’ what values is it upholding, and if girls have to preserve themselves
for marriage, are we asking the same of boys?138
Beatrice Ngcobo, Commissioner for Gender Equality, KwaZulu-Natal
This is about empowering the girl child to say no to sex, teaching her to care about her body.
Some people see it as oppression. But we are burying our youth every Saturday here. We must
do something . . . Some people are saying we are interfering with the privacy of the individual
but we are not forcing anyone. We believe the problems of today can be eradicated by going
back to the old ways. Here is the solution.139
Nomagugu Ngobese, tester
Heterogeneity is a defining feature of South Africa; there are eleven official languages140 and several
different racial and ethnic groups. The legacy of Apartheid, and its policy of strict racial separation, which
was officially advanced and violently enforced by the white minority National Party government from
1948 until 1990 continues to influence South Africa’s political culture. Under white colonial and later
Apartheid rule, indigenous African cultural practices were often exploited by various white
administrations to bolster the authority of local state appointed rulers.141 The triad of “culture, tribe, and
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Id.
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Id.
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) [hereinafter S. AFR. CONST.] Chapter I, Art.
6(1). The eleven languages are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English,
isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.
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T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1999); see also Barbara Oomen, CHIEFS IN SOUTH AFRICA: LAW, POWER & CULTURE IN THE
POST-APARTHEID ERA 13–17 (2005) (“In recognizing ‘tribal governance’ and ‘native laws and customs’ the
governments of Verwoerd and his successors built on and refined the British policy of ‘native administration.’)
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chiefdom” was used to deny Africans access to participation in democracy because “they already had
their own system of governance.”142
Since the first multi-party elections marking the country’s transition to an open and democratic
society in 1994, however, South Africans have sought to free themselves from this Apartheid legacy.
They have done so by embracing a constitutional legal order that is based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental rights143 where all would be “united in [their] diversity.”144 Accordingly, the
South African Constitution, while explicitly committed to equality, also protects cultural, linguistic and
religious communities.145
Although there are obligations to protect, promote, and preserve equality enshrined in the South
African Constitution and in the international human rights treaty obligations that have been assumed by
the government since the nation’s transition to democracy, there are also widespread norms that coexist in
the country which are on occasion at variance with the regime of constitutional rights. Virginity testing is
but one of the practices inconsistent with human rights norms and protection obligations. Indeed, the
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, a treaty monitoring body for the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child has already condemned the practice of virginity testing in South Africa. In its
concluding remarks on the report submitted by the South African government on implementation of the
Convention rights, the Committee expressed concern about “the traditional practice of virginity testing
which threatens the health, affects the self-esteem, and violates the privacy of girls.”146
A. The Legislative Battle to Ban Virginity Testing
Legal debates concerning cultural practices in South Africa have been structured as a choice between
abolition or accommodation. This oppositional conflict between culture and rights was manifested in the
arguments advanced by testing proponents and opponents alike in public hearings on provisions of draft
legislation to protect children’s rights. The legislative battle has pitted women’s rights organizations and
officials from South Africa’s Commission on Gender Equality147 against members of the National House
of Traditional Leaders.148
142

BARBARA OOMEN, CHIEFS IN SOUTH AFRICA: LAW, POWER & CULTURE IN THE POST-APARTHEID ERA 3
(2005) (The Apartheid government’s homelands policy gave effect to its central ideology—that each race and nation
within South Africa had a unique, divinely ordained destiny and cultural contribution such that they should be kept
apart so that each could develop along its own inherent lines.)
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See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL
RECONSTRUCTION 85–92 (2000).
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S. AFR. CONST., Preamble.
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter II, Art.31.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: South Africa, Twenty-Third Session CRC/C/15/Add.122 Jan. 2000 Para. 33. The Committee also expressed
concern about the practice of Female Genital Mutilation.
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The Commission on Gender Equality is an independent statutory body established in terms of Section 187,
Chapter 9 of the Constitution of South Africa charged with promoting respect for “the protection, development and
attainment of gender equality” and empowered “to monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise and report
on issues concerning gender equality.” S. Afr. Const. (Act 108 of 1996) Ch. IX (State Institutions Supporting
Constitutional Democracy) Sections 187(1), 187(2).
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Traditional leaders are accorded status and recognition is granted the institution, status and role of
traditional leadership according to customary law pursuant to Section 211, Chapter 12 of the Constitution of South
Africa. S. Afr. Const. (Act 108 of 1996) Sections 211(1), 211(2); SAPA, Cultural Groups to Protest at Commission
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To promote and protect gender equality the Commission has robustly campaigned to criminalize all
harmful social, cultural and religious practices that affect girl children. Recent efforts have focused on
the eradication of virginity testing and female genital mutilation. As early as 2000, the Commission in
cooperation with the South African Human Rights Commission149 hosted a conference on virginity testing
inviting all interested stakeholders to discuss abolition of the practice.150 Agreement and compromise
over testing practices then proved illusive.151
Over objections from traditional leaders,152 the South African Parliament initially chose an
aggressive abolition approach and decided to ban virginity testing entirely. In June 2005, the National
Assembly passed South Africa’s first Children’s Bill intended to give effect to children’s constitutional
rights and stipulate principles relating to the care and protection of children.153 After hearing submissions
from the public in 2004, the National Assembly decided to ban testing in the draft Children’s Bill.
Cultural, religious and social practices that have the potential to harm children were prohibited or
regulated in the legislation.154
When the Assembly’s Bill banning testing was referred to the second body of parliament, the
National Council of Provinces, the Council reopened debates and called for additional rounds of public
hearings on the Bill, mainly due to continuing controversy over the banning of virginity testing.155 The
Council of Provinces offered stakeholders who had not yet been heard by Parliament an opportunity to
make submissions. Representatives the National House of Traditional Leaders, the Commission on
Gender Equality, and general public were heard on the social costs and benefits of virginity testing.156
on Gender Equality Offices About Children’s Bill Outlawing Virginity Testing, Sept. 15, 2005; Elsje Bonthuys,
Accommodating Gender, Race, Culture and Religion: Outside Legal Subjectivity, 18 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (2002).
149
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taken by relevant organs of state towards the realization of rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health
care, food, water, social security education and the environment. S. Afr. Const. (Act 108 of 1996) Ch. IX (State
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy) Sections 187(1), 187(2).
150
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In response to pressure from traditional leadership, the National Council of Provinces proposed
amendments to the Bill including a compromise on testing by introducing an age threshold instead of an
outright ban and returned the issue to the National Assembly for reconsideration. The full Parliament,
consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, later entertained and agreed
upon a revised measure.
During Parliament’s final session on December 15, 2005, the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces passed the Children’s Act.157 Under the present compromise, testing is prohibited
for children under the age of 16. For girls and women over the age of 16, testing can only be performed
after counseling, in private and with consent. The test results may not be publicly disclosed, and the
individual must not be marked in any way to indicate her passage or failure of a virginity test.
Regulations to be drafted at a later date will prescribe the conditions under which the virginity testing
procedure may permissibly be carried out on children above the age of 16.158
At this writing, it appears that additional procedural difficulties have now arisen concerning certain
provisions of the Children’s Act which will further delay implementation,159 and a second Children’s Bill
is working its way through Parliament that may also slow implementation. Again against the backdrop of
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, one issue, in the second Children’s Bill is the age at which a child can access
medical treatment or contraception without their parents consent or knowledge.160 Eventually, when both
Bills have passed both bodies of Parliament, they will be consolidated and merged into a single
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Republic of South Africa, Children’s Bill B70-2003.
Children’s Bill B70D, Art.12 In pertinent part, with respect to virginity testing the legislation now provides:
→12 (1) Every child has the right not to be subjected to social, cultural and religious practices which are
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→→(a) if the child has given consent to the testing in the prescribed manner;
(b) after proper counseling of the child; and
(c ) in the manner prescribed.
(6) The results of a virginity test may not be disclosed without the consent of the child.
(7) The body of a child who has undergone virginity testing may not be marked.
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The South African Parliament follows different processes for different types of bills. Bills that deal with
matters that national government has authority over are processed according to the procedure set out in Section 75 of
the Constitution, the National Assembly has a veto power over any amendments proposed by the National Council
of Provinces. The Children’s Bill containing the testing ban was passed as a Section 75 Bill. If a Bill deals with a
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country’s law reform process. The procedure for these types of Bills are set forth in Section 76 of the Constitution.
For Section 76 Bills, the National Assembly does not enjoy veto power over amendments proposed by the National
Council of Provinces. If the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces cannot agree on an
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The same constituency advocating virginity testing, the representatives of traditional leadership, opposes the
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Children’s Act and the virginity testing ban given effect by 2008. Implementation of a final Children’s
Act before 2008 is now believed unlikely by most South African children’s rights advocates.161
The successful implementation of any new children’s legislation will depend heavily on the
cooperation of all levels of government as well as civil society. In any event, the balancing of cultural
rights with other human rights will remain a persistent challenge and in post-Apartheid South Africa’s
plural society especially in the context of HIV/AIDS.

B. Universal Rights and Cultural Differences:
Gender Equality vs. Cultural Autonomy
The controversy over virginity testing in South Africa echoes a certain theme in human rights
discourse more generally over the universal or relative character of the rights enshrined in the major
human rights instruments. There are rights which virginity testing arguably violates, such as gender
equality, and rights that testing furthers such as cultural autonomy and self-determination. The arguments
advanced from both sides of the legislative debate can find some support in international human rights
instruments as well as the South African Constitution.
Tensions between the “universal” and the “relative” character of rights have been a source of debate
since modern international human rights instruments were first framed.162 In 1947, when a Commission
on Human Rights created pursuant to the U.N. Charter considered proposals for the content of what
would become a basic declaration on human rights, the American Anthropological Association’s (AAA)
submission to the Commission challenged the drafters to acknowledge that while “respect for the
personality of the individual as such and his right to its fullest development as a member of his society”
was important, it was equally important that any Declaration emerging from the Commission’s process
demonstrate “respect for the cultures of differing human groups.”163 Observing that “[s]tandards and
values are relative to the culture from which they derive” such that “what is held to be a human right in
one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people” the AAA’s submission to the Commission
raised the question: “how can the proposed Declaration be applicable to all human beings and not be a
statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and
America?”164 The AAA’s response to attempts to draft what would become the Universal Declaration of
161

While the first Children’s Bill containing the testing ban has passed Parliament, an additional Children’s
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Human Rights captured the basic concerns animating the contemporary cultural relativist position: if
standards and values are understood to be relative to the culture from which they derive, any attempt to
formulate postulates from the beliefs or moral codes of any one culture will detract from the universal
applicability of any declaration of human rights.
Despite the apparent consensus reflected in the draft which eventually became the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. These differences have persisted over the scope and priorities of the
international human rights agenda, and are played out in rhetorical conflicts between universality versus
cultural relativism, imperialism versus self-determination or tradition versus modernity and
westernization. Today, the universalism-relativism debate takes place primarily along perceived fault
lines between the norms emanating from the North as opposed to the global South, or from the secular
West as opposed to the religious Islamic East, or from the developed nations as opposed to the developing
nations of the Third World.165 This debate may also be engaged in multiethnic states where politics are
influenced by indigenous community rights movements.166
1. Universalism
The fundamental human rights covenants were the international community’s response to the
atrocities of World War II. As a result, international human rights treaties are animated by the principles
that all individuals are entitled by virtue of their common humanity to dignity such that certain human
rights must be understood as universal, fundamental, inalienable and not to be violated by the state or
overridden by cultural or religious traditions. Accordingly, the accident of birth into a particular social
group, society or culture is irrelevant to an individuals basic intrinsic worth and his or her entitlement to
be treated with dignity.
The United Nations Charter (Charter), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) as
well as the subsequently agreed legal instruments which comprise the modern system of international
human rights treaties also evoke universal principles. With the Declaration, the founding member states
of the U.N. sought to establish “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” and
called for the “universal and effective recognition and observance” of the enumerated rights contained
within the document.167 The Declaration makes clear that all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity168 and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without
distinction of any kind such as race, sex, language, religion, and irrespective of the jurisdiction or country
to which a person belongs.169
Both of the fundamental human rights covenants: the International Convention on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
proclaim that the rights contained within them are “derive[d] from the inherent dignity of the human
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person” and reaffirm that all members of the human family possess equal and inalienable rights.170 Both
Covenants maintain that recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family provide the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
Universalism is at the heart of modern human rights law. In brief, universalism maintains that there
is a fundamental common humanity which entitles all individuals to certain basic minimal rights
irrespective of their origins—cultural, religious or otherwise. The international legal community has
generally subscribed to the view that human rights should be universal and that the human rights regime
created through the U.N. as well as other regional human rights instruments such as those promulgated by
the European, African and Inter-American regional human rights systems,171 must be enforced uniformly
despite differences in cultural and religions traditions. Were human rights to have different meanings in
Western and non-Western countries it is argued, the entire edifice of human rights law would be
significantly undermined and possibly rendered meaningless.172 Thus, universality informs the discourse
and content of the rights in the Declaration and all subsequent basic human rights treaties.
Human rights universalism finds theoretical foundations in natural law and liberalism originating in
Western philosophical thought.173 The moral theories evident in the UN documents are grounded in the
liberal tradition of Western philosophy and political theory.174 The central normative commitment of
liberalism places priority exclusively on the individual over society and community; rights are considered
immutable; and they are universal for all human beings.175
The current formulation of human rights contains three elements which reflect western values: the
fundamental rights possessing unit in society is the individual; the primary basis for securing human
existence in society is through rights, not duties; and, the primary method for securing rights is through
the rule of law where rights are claims subject to adjudication not reconciliation or negotiation.176
Generally speaking because most liberal rights universalists are committed to the principle that the
individual is the relevant moral unit of concern for rights protection and that certain fundamental rights
170
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are inviolate, an abolitionist response to harmful traditional or discriminatory cultural practices easily
follows from the enshrined rights and their theoretical foundations. From this perspective, a central
challenge for women’s rights activism in Africa and other developing countries is that while laws in the
public sphere have often been modernized through colonial contact or post-independence
constitutionalism, the laws and norms in the private sphere may remain repressive. Custom is seen by
many liberal feminists as something that perpetuates the subordination of women to men and that serves
as an impediment to the implementation of universal laws.177 Nevertheless, feminists and human rights
activists who claim universal rights in the face of the empirical reality of great diversity and divergence
from the asserted norms are hard pressed to respond to questions raised by cultural relativists.
2. Cultural Relativism
The concept that human rights are universal, and that the rule of law provides the best framework for
constructing common norms across nations and cultures, has proved rhetorically powerful and attractive.
As human rights have gained broad international respect “states regularly proclaim their acceptance of
and adherence to international human rights norms and charges of human rights violations are among the
strongest charges that can be made in international relations.”178 While appealing in theory and widely
accepted by the many nations that have ratified human rights treaties and embraced constitutionalism and
the rule of law to protect rights, rights universality has proved problematic in practice. As a result, the
foundations of human rights universalism have become subject to attack in certain quarters.179
International human rights institutions monitoring rights protection and promotion are increasingly
exposed to a growing variety of norms, values, and belief systems that depart from those norms enshrined
in the treaty instruments. Competing claims for legitimacy from various cultures and subcultures within
states are increasingly challenging the ideal of any universals.
Proponents of cultural relativism present a formidable challenge to the concept of universal norms,
rejecting the fundamental claim of the human rights regime to the universality of rights for everyone,
everywhere without exception. Relativists question the theoretical validity and intellectual coherence of
the various theories advanced to support a universal international human rights law. In recent years,
Islamic and Asian governments in particular have argued against rights universalism on grounds of
culture especially as it may pertain to the rights of women—their ratifications of most major human rights
covenants and conventions notwithstanding. Often, it is argued that because human rights ideals were
first recognized and developed by the Western powers victorious at the end of the WWII they are alien to
non-Western cultures.180 The development of international human rights law since that time has primarily
been led by Western nations, lending credence to the perception that the international human rights
regime has been deployed in a manner that is ethnocentric and unjust.181 Indeed, “[c]ultural relativists
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have targeted feminist human rights activists for imposing Western standards on non-Western cultures in
much the same way that feminists have criticized states for imposing male-defined norms on women.”182
In addition, representatives of newly organized indigenous communities around the world who desire
autonomy and legitimacy for their group identities and cultural practices, as well as others who fear that
universalism may invite unwarranted interference in ancient cultures, argue that universal norms are
simply impossible to defend in the reality of such great diversity.183 Critics of universalism argue that the
very proclamation and purported promulgation of universal human rights laws simply cannot account for
the great diversity of cultures and religions found around the world. In this view, human rights should
therefore be subordinate to local cultural and religious norms.
Cultural relativism theory gained prominence in anthropological and social scientific literature in the
years after WWII.184 Stated briefly, in anthropology, cultural relativism is a theory which asserts that
there is no absolute truth whether ethical, moral, or cultural. Accordingly, there is no meaningful way to
make principled judgments in different cultures because all judgments are inescapably ethnocentric.185
The rise of relativism in fields outside of international human rights law was a reaction to the ethnocentric
assumptions of nineteenth-century science which viewed the evolution of human societies as a process of
progressive change from the “primitive” to the “advanced”186 and incorporated extraneous value
judgments into research on the basic scheme of socioeconomic evolution of human societies which
invariably glorified Western civilizations and diminished the achievements of non-Western societies.187
Initially, in the field of anthropology, cultural relativism emerged as a challenge to the notion of the
inherent natural superiority of Western civilizations and skeptical of the broad generalizations being
advanced about other civilizations.188 Early relativists emphasized the endless diversity of humanity and
sought to demonstrate that even cultures placed at the bottom of the evolutionary scale were advanced and
sophisticated in at least some respects.189
In human rights scholarship, the relativist challenge can be summarized as follows: norms of
morality are relative to a given society; the ethical basis for international human rights is Western;
therefore, international norms should not be the basis of value judgments in other cultural contexts. In
other words, contrary to the claim of universality that human rights discourse makes, the origins of
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notions of human rights is historically and philosophically Western. Cultural relativism thus undermines
one of the most fundamental tenets of international human rights discourse.190
The relativists’ normative commitments would necessitate at the very least an accommodation of
virginity testing practices and possibly even active facilitation and encouragement of testing were it
shown to be central to the cultural life of the community. Anti-colonialism and cultural integrity
arguments are politically potent in regions that have emerged from the colonial experience, especially
perhaps in South Africa coming out of an Apartheid history. Complaints about the perceived imposition
of international human rights norms, asserting that the international human rights agenda reflects the
ideology of the West and represent “another attempt at imperialist capitalist domination of the
south”191have gained currency from the relativist critique. The contingency of the cultural relativist
approach is alarming to the liberal human rights advocate because rights are reduced from universal
values to either arbitrary products of power or particular cultural developments.192
C. Virginity Testing as Discrimination
Presently, in South Africa the abolitionist position appears to have prevailed for now—at least in
part. Some testing opponents view the fact that virginity testing was not banned outright for girls and
women of all ages as a defeat for abolitionists. Various international human rights treaties and the South
African Constitution support the position that abolition of virginity testing is necessary because as
presently practiced in South Africa it is discriminatory. The violation of bodily integrity, degradation,
humiliation, and invasion of privacy perceived by gender equality groups to accompany virginity testing
would violate the following international instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on the Rights of the Child and the South African
Constitution. South Africa has signed each of these international conventions and has ratified all but the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1. Gender Equality
Both international human rights law and the South African Constitution contain broad prohibitions of
discrimination based on sex and recognize equality of the sexes. The Universal Declaration provides: all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.193 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
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freedoms in the Universal Declaration without distinction of any kind such as sex and all are equal before
the law and entitled to equal protection of law.194
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which South Africa has ratified
requires the government to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory as well as those
individuals subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant without distinction as to sex.195
The ICCPR obligates South Africa as a state party to undertake to ensure the equal right of men and
women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the Covenant,196 which includes the
right not to be subjected to degrading treatment.
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
which South Africa has ratified in its entirety without registering any reservations or objections to
particular provisions of the treaty, prohibits discrimination against women and offers a detailed definition
of what discrimination against women must be understood to encompass. Article 1 of the Convention
defines the term “discrimination against women” as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their martial status on a basis of equality with men and women of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field.197
To bring about the end of discrimination against women as so comprehensively articulated in the
Convention’s definition, it expressly calls upon state parties to condemn discrimination against women in
all its forms and agree to pursue policy of eliminating discrimination by undertaking: to embody the
principle of equality of men and women in national constitutions and other legislation;198 to adopt
appropriate legislative and other measures prohibiting all discrimination against women;199 to refrain from
engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities
conform to this obligation;200 to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or
enterprise;201 to take all appropriate measures including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.202
Pursuant to the CEDAW, state parties are also required to take affirmative measures to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
superiority of either sex or stereotyped roles for men and women.203 The Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) also includes an anti-discrimination provision calling upon state parties to respect and
ensure the rights of all children irrespective of the child’s sex.204
The South African Constitution is the supreme law of the country—any law or conduct inconsistent
with it is invalid. The legislature, the executive, the judiciary and every organ of the state are all bound to
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respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights contained in the Constitution. The South African
Constitution states that “[the] Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines
the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom.” South Africa’s constitution also recognizes the importance of compliance with principles of
international law by providing that any of the country’s domestic laws must be interpreted in a manner
consistent with international law.205 Like the international human rights instruments, there are strong
general prohibitions against discrimination enshrined in the South African Constitution.
Equality is the foundation of South Africa’s constitutional democracy and encompasses the full and
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of law.206 The constitution provides that the state may not unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on grounds of gender or sex.207 Further, no person may unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly.208 National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair
discrimination209 whether perpetrated by the state or by a private actor. 210 Equality includes the full and
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. Because men and boys are for the most part not subjected to
virginity testing and the testing burden falls predominantly on young unmarried women and girls, the
existence of the practice constitutes discrimination.
2. Sexual Autonomy and Bodily Integrity
Issues of reproduction and sexual autonomy are at the center of strongly held ideological, religious,
and cultural notions of female gender identity. While governments often are directly responsible for
abuses in the course of implementing policies or projects that regulate women’s sexual and reproductive
decision making and actions, social and cultural norms also enforce or reinforce limitations of women’s
choices with respect to sexuality, reproduction and childbearing. Sometimes policies infringing women’s
reproductive freedoms are justified by perceived state interests in economic development or population
control and stability, as is the case with China’s one child policy.
In other instances, discriminatory social biases when combined with economic pressures constrain or
influence women’s childbearing choices without any formal state action. For instance, in certain areas of
India strong preferences for male infants over female infants influence sex-selective childbearing
decisions and have resulted in an imbalanced sex ratio. These violations are perhaps more pronounced
and prevalent where governments fail to promulgate polices that foster gender equality and ensure
women’s rights related to reproduction and sexuality. Thus, state complicity is largely found in a
government’s failure such that even where there is no direct state involvement, governments have
205
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frequently been complicit in abuses against women and girls that are carried out in the name of tradition,
culture or religion, by purposefully ignoring these violations.
Both international human rights law and South African Constitutional law can be understood not
only to protect bodily integrity but also to protect sexual autonomy and the liberty to make choices
concerning reproduction and childbirth.211 CEDAW provides that state parties must eliminate
discriminate against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and ensure on a basis
of equality with men right to enter into marriage, rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number
and spacing of their children and to have access to the information education and means to enable them to
exercise these rights.212 Similarly, CRC requires state parties shall take all appropriate legislative,
administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of violence injury or
abuse neglect or negligent treatment maltreatment or explanation including sexual abuse while in the care
of parents, legal guardians, or others.213 State parties must also undertake to protect the child from all
forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.214
Provisions of the South African Constitution recognize that everyone has the right to bodily and
psychological integrity which has been expressly enshrined in the text of the Constitution to mean that
everyone has the right to make decisions concerning reproduction as well as the right to security in and
control over their body; and the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their
informed consent.215 South Africa’s constitution also guarantees the right of the child to be “protected
from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation”216 and further provides that a child’s best interests are
to be given paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.217
Virginity testing as presently practiced in South Africa impedes the free exercise of these rights. To
the extent that the testing is physically invasive it interferes with a girl’s right to security in her body and
sexuality. To the extent that being marked as a virgin may place a child at greater risk of sexual abuse or
exploitation the practice violates obligations to protect children from abuse. Finally, to the extent that
testing is coercive, not accompanied by sex education, and presents abstinence as the only option
available, a child may be placed at even greater risk of infection and transmission because her ignorance
may undermine her ability to protect herself against the disease.
3. Privacy
Both international law and the South African Constitution provide privacy protections. The
Declaration proclaims that everyone has right to life, liberty and security of person218such that, “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, or to attacks upon his honor and reputation
211
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and all have right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”219 Similarly, the
ICCPR also provides: “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation.”220
Article 16 of the CRC extends privacy rights protections to children under the age of eighteen and
echoing the language of other human rights agreements states: “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his or her honor or reputation.” Similarly, provisions of the South African Constitution protect a right to
privacy.221
As presently practiced, virginity testing in purporting to determine who is chaste or not, and
celebrating those girls and young women who have not been sexually active while condemning those who
have, makes a public spectacle of private personal intimate matters. Virginity test results become
common knowledge in communities and serve to undermine the honor and reputation of those who are
deemed to have failed. Even if testing were not coercive, results are often arbitrary and once revealed can
have negative consequences for a child whether she is said to “pass” or “fail.”
D. Virginity Testing as Self-Determination
If I abandon the practice, it would mean that I am abandoning my culture as well, and I will not
let that happen. I am a feminist too, who is fighting for women’s rights and the practice is
definitely not an abuse.222
Virginity tester and founder of the festival Nomagugu Ngubabne
Opponents of the legislative prohibition of virginity testing reject the discrimination arguments that
women’s rights advocates advance emphasizing instead the virginity testing rite as a cultural right that
must be accepted and accommodated without intervention from the state to end or alter the practice.
Community organizations promoting virginity testing accuse the Commission for Gender Equality and
others of suppressing their cultural rights and right to self-determination. Testers insist that virginity
testing is not imposed on unwilling girls. Far from discrimination, they assert that the testing practice is
part of a celebration in some communities and an expression of people’s cultural background.223 The
prevailing sentiment among many virginity testers and others involved in the testing movement remains
that the government should understand and “cooperate with us because we have valid grounds to conduct
this.”224 Testing proponents could appeal to both international and constitutional law to defend the
practice of virginity testing and win respect for their cultural rights.
1. Cultural Autonomy and Collective Rights to Associate and Assemble
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Both international human rights law and South African Constitution provide protection for culture.
The first basis of a right to culture can be found in a state’s legal duty to guarantee the rights of minority
populations, such as groups defined by common bonds of culture, language or religion, within its borders.
States are obliged to protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
identity of minorities within their territories and to create favorable conditions to enable persons
belonging to minority groups to express their characteristics and develop their culture. Article 27 of the
Declaration proclaims that everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of their
community. In states with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, the ICCPR commands that such
persons not be denied “rights in community” with others, formulated as follows: “persons belonging to
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”225
The ICESCR, which South Africa has signed but not yet ratified, provides a similar cultural rights
protection, requiring state parties to recognize the right of everyone to take part in cultural life by taking
steps necessary for conservation and development and diffusion of culture and science.226 Article 30 of
the CRC also offers protection to cultural rights in community. Again, like the ICCPR, it provides that in
states with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin, a child who belongs
to such a minority or who is an indigenous child shall not be denied the right in community with other
members of his or her group to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own
religion or to use his or her own language.227
Some commentators contest who is supposed to benefit from the minority cultural rights contained in
international rights agreements. The treaty provisions speak of persons pursuing their rights and it is
generally accepted that individuals are the principle right holders, but they may enjoy their culture only in
community with the other members of their group. Some commentators have suggested that this might
signify that the collectivity also has a legal interest in cultural association and expression as a given
ethnic, religious, or linguistic group.228
For those who reject the idea that a group or collective can possess rights, a form of cultural rights
expression can be located in an individual’s right to associate and assemble with others.229 The Universal
Declaration provides that everyone has right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association but no one
shall be compelled to associate.230 Like the Declaration, the ICCPR in Article 21 provides that a right of
peaceful assembly shall be recognized such that no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those in conformity with national security, public safety, and public health. Similarly, the CRC
in Article 15 calls upon state parties to recognize rights of the child to freedom of assembly and
association.231

225

ICCPR Art. 27.
ICESCR Art. 15. South Africa has signed, but not ratified the ICESCR.
227
CRC Art. 30.
228
T.W. Bennett, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION (1995) Unfortunately, the Declaration does not specify whether beneficiaries of the latter rights are
groups or individuals.
229
Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights? in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 238 (Will
Kymlicka ed., 1995).
230
UDHR Art. 20.
231
CRC 15. For an analysis of how governments might interpret and apply universal human rights standards
across diverse perceptions of childhood in a principled manner see Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of
226

31

32

LAW JOURNAL

[GEORGE

The South African Constitution is more explicit than international instruments on the question of
culture, in that it recognizes and protects a right to culture guaranteeing that everyone has the right to use
the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice.232 To that end, the Constitution
provides: “persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right,
with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their
language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of
civil society.”233 However, these cultural rights may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any
other provisions of the Bill of Rights.234
2. Self Determination
As an incident of the historical period in which they were drafted, when much of the world’s
population lived under colonial administration, the modern human rights instruments contain strong
statements advancing the right of self-determination. For instance, the ICCPR acknowledges: “All
peoples have the right of self-determination and may freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic social and cultural development.”235 Similarly, the ICESCR acknowledges: “All
Peoples have right of self-determination and as such may freely determine their political status and pursue
their economic social and cultural development.”236
The CRC calls on state parties to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or where
applicable the members of the extended family or community as provided for by the local custom. Legal
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child must provide, in a manner consistent with the
evolving capacities of the child appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the
rights recognized in the Convention.237
E. Virginity Testing Distinguished
Despite recent legislative prohibitions, the virginity testing issue in South Africa still remains locked
in a “traditional” versus “modern” paradigm, where culture is equated with tradition while human and
constitution rights are equated with modernity and foreign Western ideals.238 The ban has been met with
condemnation by testers and traditionalists who have pledged to continue testing.239 In Pietermaritzburg
and Durban, hundreds of women marched in opposition to the ban and Inkosi Mzimela, the chairperson of
South Africa’s House of Traditional Leaders, an Assembly of tribal chiefs called the legislation an
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“outrage” and warned that communities would defy it.240 These objections serve as another reminder that
a given right, no matter how enshrined in public international law or constitutional charters, may not be
universally accepted.241 Accordingly, law makers must consider to what degree a liberal constitutional
democracy, such as South Africa, must by virtue of its own commitments take cultural justifications for
departures from gender equality seriously when articulated by those most affected.242
The virginity testing debate as it has been engaged in South Africa exposes the persistent theoretical
and practical tensions between human rights universalism and cultural relativism. In this respect, the
debate over virginity testing is not unlike women’s rights struggles elsewhere in the world; for example, it
bears a strong resemblance to earlier controversies surrounding the attempted eradication of female
circumcision in other parts of Africa.243 Although the two practices are different in nature, both customs
are viewed by feminists as socially oppressive while others who are engaged in these practices understand
themselves to be embracing self-constituting expressions of traditional culture. Virginity testing, like
female circumcision, also departs from the classic rights violation paradigm in which governments
constrain the liberty of individuals because it is private individuals, operating without express government
approval, who are arguably violating the rights of girls and young women. Feminists and human rights
scholars have generated a substantial body of literature on the potential role of human rights law in
eradicating female genital cutting and other harmful traditional cultural and religious practices.244
Whether advancing abolition, accommodation, or cross-cultural conversations, the literature reflects deep
conflicts about whether when confronted with cultural beliefs held by women inside a particular
community, the international human rights system can as an “outsider” make ethical judgments about
cultural practices and how these practices should be treated in national and international laws.245
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Virginity can be distinguished from female genital cutting and other harmful traditional and cultural
practices women rights advocates struggle against in other parts of the world in that it is a cultural
practice that has changed its character becoming uprooted from its origins in matrimonial preparation and
established as a grass-roots public health movement. This change seems to have escaped some opponents
of the practice who have discounted the new rationale accompanying the virginity testing resurgence.
Thus, contemporary virginity testing adds a new dimension to the human rights discourse on the tension
between rights universalism and cultural relativism. Here, advocates of the cultural practice at issue are
changing (or supplementing) their rationale for performing the practice. Recasting the testing resurgence
more as a matter of preventative public health strategy and less about culture potentially creates a new
space for dialog among the stakeholders in the legislative debates over the practice.
IV. LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLE LINES:
FORBEARANCE VS. PERFORMANCE
What is clear is that the ban on virginity testing in South Africa’s children’s rights legislation,
whenever it enters into effect, will not stop virginity testing,246 just as virginity testing will likely not stop
AIDS or decrease the rate of HIV infection.247 To date, the way in which the issue has been framed in the
political process illustrates the limitations of conceiving of rights as absolute and oppositional
underscoring the theoretical and political vulnerabilities of the universality of human rights to claims from
cultural relativism when conceptualized in this manner.
The debates on virginity testing have been simultaneously engaging and impoverished, highlighting
the limitations of prevalent conceptions of rights as rigid, culture as static, and gender equality as
conflicting with cultural autonomy. These tensions are by no means inevitable when rights are seen as
complementary instead of conflicting. For example, realization of the right to education248 complements
the right to political participation in public affairs249 and may in turn strengthen respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms overall. Moreover, there are conceptualizations of rights which are not
entirely absolute, for example, some rights can be derogated in times of emergency under international
law.250 Similarly, the South African Constitution incorporates a “limitations clause” which appreciates
that only a limited number of rights are always absolute.251
246
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Stakeholders in the virginity testing legislative battle have drawn the wrong battle lines. The
arguments advanced by testing abolitionists are flawed for failing to appreciate the opportunities that
culture may present for change. The arguments advanced by those who maintain that testing should be
accepted and accommodated unchanged simply ignore the empirical fact that testing practices have
indeed changed over time. The common and disappointing feature shared by both sides of the debate has
been their tendency to see virginity testing itself as the problem and to frame the possible solutions as
either abolition or accommodation.
Each side of the testing debate is in some measure demanding of the other side forbearance from
interference with a favored basic right viewed as under threat from the other side’s ideological positions
or actions. For example, feminists with the Commission for Gender Equality did not want traditional
communities interfering with the bodies and rights of young women and girls. Traditional leaders
representing testers did not want the government and others perceived as outsiders to interfere with the
community’s right to express their culture through the practice of virginity testing. To testing opponents
the children’s rights legislation is not sufficient to protect gender equality. To testing proponents the
children’s rights legislation is a significant infringement on cultural freedoms.
It is suggested here that advocates on both sides of this debate and the young women and girls at the
heart of it would be better served if there were calls for intervention at all levels from the community, to
the South African government, to the international community, to realize a meaningful right to health and
prevent premature death and disease from HIV/AIDS.
Indeed, it is the South African government’s initial failure to adequately meet its obligations and
duties owed to its citizens and those in its jurisdiction in the first instance that gave rise to the virginity
testing resurgence. Virginity testing has become an adaptive self-help solution where there are limited
options for women to successfully avoid infection and obtain treatment for infection. Stakeholder
demands should be for performance, not forbearance and non-interference.
Classic rights discourse distinguishes “negative” rights imposing constitutional restraints on the state
from “positive” rights implicating affirmative state duties.252 So, while disappointing, it is perhaps not as
surprising that the virginity testing debate became so polarized and misdirected as both the gender
equality and cultural autonomy positions appear to be rooted in a human rights discourse built on
normative foundations that invite conceptualizations of rights as requiring forbearance and noninterference. Had rights been conceptualized more expansively in the conversation over virginity testing,
the dialog may more readily have reached the question of the substance and content of the right to health
and the protection obligations owed to children by both the government and their communities under
international and constitutional law in a pandemic infectious disease context.
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Executive Council for Education (1996) (discussing what is reasonable and justifiable as dependent upon
circumstances); S. v. Makwanyane (1995) (formulating the relevant factors to be assessed in evaluating a policy
limiting certain rights); see generally, GEORGE DEVENISH, A COMMENTARY ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF
RIGHTS (1999).
252
Jeanne Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as A Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 763,765 (2003) (noting that assumed dichotomy between positive and negative rights blurs the true
dilemma social rights pose for the liberal paradigm which is that rights implicating the redistribution of social
resources are collective in charter and rooted in the common needs of society).
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A. The Right to Health
Both international human rights law and the South African Constitution recognize some form of a
health right. The Declaration proclaims that everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well-being.253 Similarly, the ICESCR, which has been signed but not yet ratified by South
Africa, recognizes a right “to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.”254 To achieve the full realization of this right, governments must, among other things undertake
measures to ensure the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other
diseases255 and to facilitate the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention.256 South Africa has ratified the CRC which recognizes the right of the child to enjoy
the highest attainable standard of health.257 In addition, pursuant to CEDAW, which South Africa has also
ratified, the government must undertake “to ensure on a basis of equality of men and women, access to
health care services.”258
While the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” formulation of the health right
contained in many of the international human rights instruments does not expressly adopt the broad
definition of health as contained in the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),259 nor does
it confine the discussion of the right to health as simply a right to timely and appropriate health care
services. Rather, this formulation has been interpreted by international human rights monitoring bodies to
encompass the underlying determinants of health as well, and involves a “range of socio-economic factors
that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life . . . such as food and nutrition, housing,
access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a
healthy environment.”260 Access to health related education and information, including information on
sexual and reproductive health are also important aspects of the right to health.261
The “highest attainable standard of health” norm does consider both the individual’s biological and
socioeconomic preconditions and a State’s available resources.262 Thus, the right to health is not to be
253

UDHR Art. 25.
ICESCR Art. 12.
255
ICESCR Art. 12(c).
256
ICESCR Art. 12(d).
257
CRC Art. 24 provides that governments must strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of
access to health care services. Article 24 also outlines measures governments should pursue to attain full
implementation of the health right. Among other things, governments are “to ensure that all segments of society, in
particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic
knowledge of child health and nutrition . . .”. Art. 24(2) (e). States are also encouraged “to develop preventive health
care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services,” Art. 24(2) (f) and to “take all effective and
appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.” Art. 24(4).
258
CEDAW Art. 12. The state obligation to eliminate discrimination against women in health care also extends
to health care services related to family planning.
259
The Constitution of the WHO conceptualizes health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Constitution of the World Health Organization
(1946).
260
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(2000).
261
Id. at Para. 11.
262
Id. at Para 9.
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understood as the “right to be healthy.”263 Indeed, observing that genetic factors, individual susceptibility
to ill health and the adoption of unhealthy or risky lifestyles play a significant role in an individual’s
health, the monitoring body for the ICESCR has explained that: “there are a number of aspects which
cannot be addressed . . . good health cannot be ensured by a State, nor can States provide protection
against every possible cause of human ill health.”264 Nevertheless, there are many aspects of health which
a State can and should influence.
Under international law, the right to health contemplates both freedoms, such as the freedom to
control one’s body and to be free from torture and non-consensual medical treatment and
experimentation; and entitlements, such as the availability of and equal access to public health care
facilities, goods and services.265 Acknowledging the resource constraints of many States, international
law allows for “progressive realization over time” of the health right.266 However, States still have
specific and continuing legal obligations “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible toward full
realization” of the health right and must take “deliberate, concrete and targeted” steps towards this end.267
State parties to international human rights treaties containing the health right are obligated to respect,
protect and fulfill it.268
Under international law, with respect to the realization of socioeconomic rights, States have a core
obligation to “ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of the rights.”269 The
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) has determined that
among the “minimum core” obligations associated with the health right are the obligations: to ensure the
263

Id. at Para. 8.
Id. at Para. 9.
265
Id. at Para. 8, 12. There are four essential elements to the right to health: availability, accessibility,
acceptability and quality. A State must provide functioning public health-care facilities, goods, services and
programs in sufficient quantity. The precise nature of these will vary depending a State’s level of development. A
State must make such health facilities accessible to everyone without discrimination. The non-discrimination in
accessibility element has three related features including: physical accessibility, economic accessibility and
information accessibility. Health facilities should be within safe physical reach for all segments of the State’s
population especially to vulnerable or marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, indigenous populations
women, children and people with disabilities. Health facilities should be affordable for all. Information accessibility
includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues.
266
Id. at Para. 30.
267
Id. at Para. 30, 31.
268
Id. at Para. 33. The obligation to fulfill includes the obligation to facilitate, provide and promote health
through sufficient recognition of the right in national political and legal systems and the adoption of a national
health policy and public health infrastructure. Id. at Para. 36 Obligations to protect include the duties of the State to
adopt legislative measures to control the marketing of medicines and medical equipment to ensure that medical
practitioners and other health professionals meet appropriate standards of education and practice consistent with
ethical codes of conduct. States are also obligated to ensure that harmful social or traditional practices do not
interfere with access to health related information and services. Id. at Para. 35. Finally, the obligation to respect the
right to health requires a State to refrain from denying or limiting equal access, to abstain from discriminatory
practices in the delivery of health services relating to women’s health status and needs, to refrain from prohibiting or
impeding “traditional preventive care, healing practices and medicines,” to refrain from applying coercive medical
treatments, and to refrain from censoring or withholding or intentionally misrepresenting health-related information.
Id. at Para. 34. States also should refrain from limiting access to contraceptives and other means of maintaining
sexual and reproductive health, health-related information includes sexual education and information.
269
Id. at Para. 43. (restating the minimum core concept).
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right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis; to provide essential
drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Program on Essential Drugs; to adopt and
implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence,
addressing the health concerns of the whole population; to take measures to prevent, treat and control
epidemic and endemic diseases; to provide education and access to information concerning the main
health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them.270
Violations of the health right can occur through the direct action of States where governments repeal
or suspend legislation necessary for the continued enjoyment of the right to health or adopt legislation or
policies which are manifestly incompatible with international or domestic legal obligations in relation to
the right to health.271 Alternatively, violations may also occur through the omission or failure of States to
take necessary measures arising from legal obligations such as the failure to have a national policy and
failure to enforce relevant laws related to health protection.272
The South African Constitution guarantees the right “to have access to—health care services,
including reproductive health care273” The Constitution obligates the government to “take reasonable
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realization of these
rights.”274 To date, the South African Constitutional Court has adjudicated two major health right cases,
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health275and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign.276 The Court
has rejected the “minimum core” concept advanced under international human rights law277 and has
270

Id. at Para. 43–45. For a discussion of the UNCESCR’s understanding of the core of the right to health in
the South African context see, G. Bekker, Introduction to the Rights Concerning Health Care in THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION IN A COMPILATION OF ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS ON THE RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE 1, 15–16
(G. Bekker ed., 2000).
271
Id. at Para. 48. Violations of the health right may also occur when other private non-state entities that are
insufficiently regulated by government impede the highest attainable standard of health. Examples of violations of
the obligation to respect health include the denial of health care facilities to particular individuals or groups as a
result of de jure or de facto discrimination, the deliberate withholding or misrepresentation of information vital to
health protection or treatment. Id. at Para. 50. Examples of violations of the obligation to protect follow from the
failure of the State to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons within the jurisdiction from infringements of
the right to heath by third parties, including the failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or
corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to health of others. Id. at Para. 51. Examples of
violations of the obligation to fulfill include failure to adopt national health policy , insufficient expenditure or
misallocation of public resources and failure to monitor realization of the health right through indicators and
benchmarks failure to take measure to reduce eh inequitable distribution of health facilities goods and services.
272
Id. at Para. 49.
273
S. Afr. Const. Ch. II Art. 27(1).
274
Id. Art. 27(2). The Constitution also provides that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
275
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (1997) CCT 32/97.
276
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) CCT8/02.
277
See UNCESCR General Comment 3 The Nature of State Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant
(1990) Para. 10. See also Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR (1987) (“Limburg Principles”);
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) (“Maastricht Guidelines”).
The minimum core approach to socioeconomic rights enforcement envisions the identification of subsistent levels of
a given right and attaches an immediate obligation to meet that basic level. The minimum core has been said to
represent a “floor” of immediately enforceable entitlements from which progressive realization should proceed. See
Arnold Chapman, Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health and the Relevance for South Africa in
EXPLORING THE CORE CONTENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: SOUTH AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, 35–37 (D. Brand & S. Russell eds., 2002).
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instead devised a “reasonableness approach” to the assessment and enforcement of socioeconomic
rights.278
In Soobramoney v. Minister of Health279 (Soobramoney) the Court dismissed the case of a
chronically-ill man, Soobramoney, who failed to establish that the state was in breach of its constitutional
obligations. Soobramoney, an unemployed diabetic, with renal failure and in need of regular kidney
dialysis, challenged a state hospital’s decision to limit dialysis care to patients eligible for a transplant.
Because he suffered from a combination of different complications rendering his condition irreversible,
the hospital determined that treatment would prolong his life but not cure him such that he was ineligible
for a transplant or further dialysis treatment. The Court rejected arguments that the right to health
required the state to make additional resources available for dialysis treatment. Applying a
reasonableness test to the hospital treatment guidelines, the Court explained, “[t]he State has to manage
its limited resources in order to address all these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt
a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular
individuals within society.”280
In Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign281 (TAC), AIDS advocacy groups sued the
government claiming that the measures adopted by government in the area of health care services to HIVpositive pregnant women were constitutionally deficient in two respects: first, the government prohibited
administration of the antiretroviral drug, Nevirapine, in the public health sector outside of pilot research
and training sites; and second, the government failed to develop and implement a comprehensive national
program for preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV. These omissions, it was argued, violated the
right to health.282
The Court rejected the argument that a minimum core obligation similar to that defined by the
UNCESCR in relation to the right to health under international law would require the government to
provide Nevirapine as an “essential drug.”283 The Court declined to find that the Constitution imposed any
minimum core obligation: “[i]t is impossible to give everyone access to even a ‘core’ service
immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to

278

Marius Pieterse, Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care Services,
22 SOUTH AFRICAN J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 472, 474 (2006) Broadly, the reasonableness approach is an assessment of
the rationality, coherence, flexibility, fairness and inclusiveness of state policies aimed at the progressive realization
of socioeconomic rights. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) (articulating
reasonableness standard and factors to be considered in context of right to housing). For a discussion of the
Constitutional Court’s treatment of socioeconomic rights, see generally, Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating NonJusticiable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUMBIA HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 321 (2007).
279
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (1997) CCT 32/97
280
Soobramoney at para. 31
281
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) CCT8/02. The cost of Nevirapine was not an issue
in the proceedings, TAC para 71.
282
TAC paras. 3, 44–45. Nevirapine is a potent fast-acting antiretroviral drug used worldwide in the treatment
of HIV/AIDS. In 2001, it was approved by the WHO for use by pregnant women to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV at birth. The drug had been approved for these uses in South Africa.
283
Nevirapine appears on the WHO’s list of essential drugs which should be provided as part of the minimum
core of the right to health according to the UNCESCR. It was also available to the government free of charge. TAC
at para. 4.
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provide access to the socio-economic rights . . . on a progressive basis.”284 Next, applying a
reasonableness inquiry, the Court found the government’s policy of restricting the availability of
Nevirapine in the public health sector to be unreasonable. In addition, the Court decided that the
government had not reasonably addressed the need to reduce the risk of HIV positive mothers
transmitting the virus to their babies at birth. Still, the Court qualified that its finding of unreasonableness
should not be taken to “mean that everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment.”285
Some commentators have been critical of the Court’s approach to socioeconomic rights arguing that
it has in effect undermined meaningful enforcement of an individual entitlement to the right to health.286
Others maintain that “reasonableness” does not entirely foreclose enforcement of socioeconomic rights.287
Commenting on South Africa’s socioeconomic rights cases, Jeanne Woods has suggested that the
jurisprudence is evolving from the rejection of individual rights claims for life-preserving medical
treatments to the recognition of collective rights to comprehensive government programs to address
urgent social needs.288 Further, Woods observes that the Court has more readily acknowledged rights and
correlative state duties where there was a history of political struggle demanding their recognition, noting
that AIDS case law is developing against the background of domestic and international civil society
political movements.289 The gender equality and cultural autonomy political movements presently in
conflict over virginity testing may find some common ground, if not consensus, by engaging the
government on the nature of its obligation to realize the health right. Undoubtedly, the nature of the
individual or collective entitlement to the health right in South Africa will be further articulated and
developed in the years to come and deeply influenced by the AIDS crisis.

284

TAC at para. 34–35 (“the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling
everyone that the minimum core be provided to them.”).
285
TAC para. 125.
286
See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations
for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 SOUTH AFRICA JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 8–9 (2003);
Marius Pieterse, Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights: Contemplating
the South African Experience, 26 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 882, 898–99 (2004).
287
See, e.g., Jonathan Klaaren, A Remedial Interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign Decision, 19
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 455 (2003); see also Pieterse, Resuscitating Socio-economic Rights,
supra note 278, at 498 (arguing that it is possible to recast the TAC decision as finding an entitlement to receive
safe and efficacious medical treatment where such treatment has been medically indicated, as long as the treatment
is affordable and where capacity to administer it exists.”); Mark Kende, The South African Constitutional Court’s
Construction of Socio-Economic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 617 (2004); Eric C.
Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional
Court, 38 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 321 (2007).
288
Jeanne Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 763,
790 (2003). Woods reconciles the results in the Soobramoney and TAC cases as follows:
Both kidney disease and AIDS are serious, life-threatening harms. However, the AIDS epidemic has all
of the characteristics of a classic “public” health crises: a communicable disease that threatens the entire
population. As such, AIDS more readily falls within the traditional scope of liberal state responsibility.
In contrast, kidney disease no matter how widespread, is seen as a “private” misfortune; its victims, while
generating sympathy may even be deemed “undeserving” of an urgent public response by having made
bad lifestyle choices. Notably, in [TAC], the beneficiaries of constitutional relief were not the infected
mothers, but the innocent—hence “deserving”—infants to whom the disease was transmitted in utero.
289
Id. at 791.
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B. Reconsidering the Role of Culture
Abolitionist approaches to customary practices, by immediately identifying culture as the culprit,
compromise the possibility of identifying avenues to adapt a particular practice in a way that does not
offend human rights norms. Further, legal bans, criminalization and other forms of abolishing traditional
practices do not encourage a holistic understanding of the context in which cultural practices are
embedded and as a result prevent comprehensive solutions. Indeed, by “consigning culture to the role of
violator,” 290 human rights proponents risk missing openings presented within culture and fail to work
collaboratively with community members committed to social change, thus precluding a positive role for
culture in the pursuit of gender equality.291
To some, the legislative ban on virginity testing has been taken as evidence that South Africa’s new
constitutionalism means characterizing their culture as an obstacle to development and gender equality.
Third World feminists have expressed concerns over similar calls to abolish traditions and customs in
other areas. The concerns expressed by these African feminists stem in part from their experiences that
abolitionist responses to traditional practices are based in mistaken impressions that women’s rights
simply do not exist at all in custom or local practice, such that solutions may only be found by
substituting custom and local practice with alternatives offered by medical science which are unfamiliar
or not trusted.
The arguments advanced by traditionalists in defending virginity testing and demanding
accommodation are not without their flaws. Despite their use of rights rhetoric, traditionalists have chosen
to frame “culture” as integrated, holistic, and static. In contrast, the understandings emerging in
contemporary anthropological literature is that “culture is fragmentary, contested, and shifting.” Far from
being something to be preserved for its own sake, frozen in time and place, anthropology now sees culture
as “connected to global systems of meaning and power, continually constituted and reconstituted through
processes of interpretation, invention and imposition.”292 Culture is dynamic, responds to social change,
and undergoes transformation over time.293
Indeed, the revival of virginity testing seems to typify the constituted, reconstituted and transformed
thesis offered by the insights of anthropologists. It is not seriously contested that, before the AIDS crisis,
virginity testing had fallen out of favor and had all but ceased due to pressures that had changed social
structures. Virginity testing has reemerged in its current form largely in response to HIV/AIDS. Testers
290

Celestine Nyamu, How Should Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender
Hierarchy in Developing Countries? 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 381 (2000). see also Abdullahi An-Na’im, Promises We
Should All Keep in Common Cause, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, at 27–28 (Joshua Cohen et al.
eds., 1999).
291
Id.
292
Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 CAN.
J. L. & SOC. 247. 268-270 (1997) (explaining how “rights and legal remedies offer a narrow definition of social
problems such as gender inequality and provide a restricted and individualistic set of remedies” rather than
addressing “the broader cultural productions that foster violence against women) ; see also Ann-Belinda S. Preis,
Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 286 (1996)
(discussing rights as cultural practice).
293
Nyamu (“People are not simply the naïve product of a rigid and static society,” except in the uninformed
imagination of some people in Western societies who view Third World societies as “stable, timeless, ancient,
lacking in internal conflict, and premodern”); see also Katha Pollitt, Whose Culture? in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD
FOR WOMEN?, at 27–28 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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who have promised to continue testing children despite the law say they do what they are doing to save
the women and children of South Africa and ensure a future for the nation, not solely to preserve culture
per se.
Bringing to bear this understanding of culture to the testing controversy, culture presents not just an
obstacle but perhaps an opportunity to ensure that cultural changes incorporate and advance women’s
equality. The testing phenomenon itself illustrates how reactive and adaptive communities can be. It is
possible, indeed more likely than not that without interventions that engage both gender equality and
cultural autonomy, changes in cultural currents will remain harmful to girls and women even after other
aspects of social life have evolved in a more progressive rights respecting manner. Thus, the question
becomes how to promote a more progressive adaptation that improves the status of women.
C. Efficacy of Legislative Efforts
A legislative strategy for controlling virginity testing establishes, and limits, the domain of
concern—to test or not to test.294 In South Africa, the domain of concern needs to be wider. Even if
virginity testing is effectively abolished by the legislative prohibition, society will still need to address the
HIV/AIDS epidemic and its disproportionate impact on women. What must be recognized is the need to
expand the domain of concern beyond abolishing or accommodating virginity testing to alter the broader
cultural norms that foster HIV infection and women’s inequality in society which served to motivate the
testing resurgence in the first instance.
Legal anthropologists have observed that legislation rarely has its intended effect because in the
“social field” in which it must operate; ties of community and mutual obligation are frequently stronger
than external law.295 The effectiveness of any human right will depend less on legislative action than on
the extent to which that right is embraced or ignored by the community’s leaders who dictate the nonstate laws and norms of morality, custom and honor.296 Thus, “in communicating and devising laws and
policies related to HIV/AIDS, law makers must consider the effect of their journey through social fields
whose rules and obligations may rival those of the state.”297
V. MOVING BEYOND ABOLITION VS. ACCOMMODATION:
ALTERING CULTURALLY REINFORCED INEQUALITY

294

Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 Can. J.
L. & Soc. 247 (1997).
295
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject
of Study in LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY (Sally Falk Moore ed. 1973); see also John Griffiths,
What is Legal Pluralism? 24 JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1–26 (1986); E. Ehrlich, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1986) (“The social association is the source of the coercive power, the sanction of al
social norms, of law no more than of morality, ethical, custom, religion, honor . . . the state is not the only
association that exercises coercion; there is an untold number of associations in society that exercise [coercion]
much more forcibly than the state.”)
296
Kathryn Bromley Chan, From Legal Universalism to Legal Pluralism: Expanding and Enhancing the
Human Rights Approach to HIV/AIDS, 21 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 191 (2005).
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Rights are cultural resources deployed in specific cultural contexts by local agents operating
within legally and culturally plural frameworks.298
Sally Engle Merry
Rights purport to solve problems, but when stated abstractly—it is claimed they are at most the
beginning of a discussion.299
Cass Sunstein
When gender biased social arrangements are defended in the name of culture, their purported
cultural norms need to be challenged.300
Celestine Nyamu
Just as the tensions between universalism and relativism will continue to preoccupy theorists,
women’s human rights activists will continue to struggle with how best to eradicate harmful traditional
practices.301 Conversations concerning virginity testing will also continue. As practical matter,
stakeholders must move beyond the “abolish or accommodate” paradigm and seek adaptation through a
pragmatic pluralist approach that accounts for the social context that creates and maintains inequalities
rendering girls and women vulnerable to disease and premature death. Applying insights on pluralism
from legal anthropology and analyzing the pragmatism of the South African Constitutional Court’s
emerging jurisprudence on the question of culture and customary law, it is observed that both rights and
cultural practices in an open, democratic and plural society such as South Africa are not rigid but rather
“social and collective in character.”302 This means that both can allow for compromise, deliberation, and
assessment of competing considerations. In the abstract, the rights to equality and culture do not tell us
how to handle particular problems or how to decide between conflicting claims of rights, as evidenced by
the virginity testing debate. In this context, resolution of conflicting claims will require (in addition to a
discursive shift in the virginity testing debate towards a focus on health and other initiatives to combat
HIV/AIDS), a pragmatic approach to cultural pluralism, and a constitutional interpretive mode which
appreciates rights in context and allows for contemporary social and cultural change.
A. Rights, Pluralism and Pragmatism
A framework of pragmatic legal pluralism that appreciates how both rights and culture are mobilized
locally can facilitate a move beyond the dichotomies of the universalism versus relativism debate and the
limited options of abolition or accommodation that have consumed the virginity testing controversy.
Historically, legal pluralists examined the overlapping normative systems created during the process of
colonization where indigenous and European law operated simultaneously. Broadly, the study of legal
pluralism today examines situations where more than one normative system occupies the same social field
298

Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 CAN.
J. L. & SOC. 247 (1997)
299
Cass Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (1995).
300
Celestine Nyamu, How Should Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender
Hierarchy in Developing Countries? 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 381 (2000).
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Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 Can.
J. L. & Soc. 247 (1997).
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Cass Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (1995).
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and attempts to understand a variety of forms of non-state normative ordering. The pluralist perspective,
by recognizing that multiple norms interact and influence individuals and communities, renders the
abolition versus accommodation paradigm irrelevant on some level because it can appreciate context and
explain the disconnect between formal legal efforts to abolish a given practice and social change.
Pluralism thus opens avenues for mediating between the different normative orders governing the lives of
individuals and communities. Along the same lines, pragmatism holds that meaning is relative to the
time, place and purpose of an inquiry. As such meanings may be modified as more knowledge is
acquired.303 Pragmatism methodologically demands that we assess competing normative orders with a
view towards practical consequences. The pragmatist perspective therefore calls for an active
interrogation of the consequences which flow from cultural practices and also allows for adaptation.
Legal anthropologist Sally Merry, in her research on women’s movements against domestic violence
among Pacific Islander communities, has observed:
[s]ocial movements take shape within a legally plural world. Multiple legal orders are arrayed
side by side in various geographical locations as well as up and down in local state national,
regional and global systems. These orders are not autonomous but in constant interaction, the
power of each is constrained by the power of others.304
Research on legal pluralism demonstrates the nature of these orders and their relationships are
locally and historically variable. This multiplicity is not new, but the relative importance of each legal
order and the nature of the interactions among them are constantly changing.305
In the pluralistic legal setting that characterizes South Africa and many developing countries,
confronting the politics of culture will require understanding the flexibility and variation of custom in
order to challenge the arguments that deploy culture as a justification for gender inequality.306 For
instance, Celestine Nyamu, a Third World Feminist, advocates “critical pragmatic engagement” with
culture instead of condemnation as a matter of course. She has observed that while the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women calls for change, it does not “dictate the
process for achieving change leaving open the possibility of a flexible process for evaluating assertions of
303

See generally, WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS; A.J. AYER, THE ORIGINS OF
PRAGMATISM (1968); H.S. THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM (1968 repr.
1981); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); L. MENAND, PRAGMATISM: A READER (1997); THE
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM (M. Dickstein, ed., 1999).
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Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 CAN.
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culture in context.”307 She maintains that this flexibility is particularly important in settings where
overlap between formal legal institutions and policy and cultural norms may render laws purporting to
abolish certain customs custom both meaningless and unrealistic.308 The “problem” of culture can be
dealt with effectively if those engaged in driving changes are making choices and reacting to material and
institutional conditions they confront in society. Changing these conditions, in this case promoting
health, may change a culture’s response to disease. If material and institutional conditions are improved
to better address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the testing movement may be redirected.
As a practical matter, South Africa’s Commission for Gender Equality would do well to locate the
space in local context that provides for the recognition of women’s rights while avoiding creating the
impression that the only solution lies in substituting local custom with legislation banning cultural
practices. It is important to utilize the openings present in local cultural or religious traditions while
simultaneously working toward expanding conceptualization of rights and reforming the configuration of
national legislation, constitutions, and administrative institutions.309 Arguing against virginity testing on
the basis of its inconsistency with human rights standards and ideals of gender equity in development
does not go far enough, and may even be counterproductive.
Where may such openings exist? Third World Feminists committed to the global women’s rights
movement have called for a cross-cultural dialog which seeks the pursuit of a global consensus viewing
the relationship between international human rights and local culture as a “genuinely reciprocal global
collaborative effort.”310 They advocate a two-way sharing of perspective drawing upon a given
community’s respective internal discourses about cultural rites and women’s rights.311 South Africa’s
Constitutional structure and human rights culture is well equipped for pragmatically fostering exactly the
sort of internal and cross-cultural dialog that an open, democratic and heterogeneous society demands.
B. Contextual Constitutionalism
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assertions of the rigid notions of custom must be met with empirical evidence of the flexibility, variety, and richness
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South Africa’s constitution has been described as ‘a history bridge’ leading from a past of prejudice
and Apartheid to a future of democracy and ubuntu.312 Under the new democratic order, because
fundamental rights were given priority due to South Africa’s repressive past, some commentators have
expressed concern that the decision to do so would not bode well for African customary law.313
South Africa is characterized by a pluralistic legal setting. The Constitution explicitly allows for
pluralism by recognizing validity of traditional authority as well as the right of persons belonging to a
cultural, religious or linguistic community to engage in cultural practices. The exercise of cultural rights
is subject to Constitutional law, however, in that cultural rights may not be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, practices which may be legitimate
under customary law are open to challenge under the Constitution. In sum, rather than a legal revolution,
the Constitution was a compromise that set in motion a more moderate process of transformation.314
1. The Bhe Case: The Evolution of Customary Law
South Africa’s Constitutional Court recently confronted the challenge traditional cultural norms
present to gender equality when it took up the question of the constitutional validity of the principle of
male primogeniture as contained in the African customary law of succession and Apartheid era legislation
in the combined cases of Nonkululeko Bhe v. The Magistrate of Khayelitsha and Others (Bhe) and
Charlotte Shibi v. Mantabeni Freddy Sithole and Others (Shibi).315
312

Elsje Bonthuys, Accommodating Gender, Race, Culture and Religion: Outside Legal Subjectivity, 18
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for largely cosmetic effects, there is little possibility that the particular conceptualization of rights in the new South
Africa will alter the patterns of power, wealth and privilege established under apartheid”).
315
Because the analysis in both cases was similar only the Bhe case will be discussed in depth. In Shibi, the
applicant’s brother died intestate. He was not married or in a customary union at the time of his death. He had no
children and was not survived by a parent or grandparent. His nearest male relatives were two cousins. The
Magistrate of Wonderboon appointed one of the deceased’s male cousins as representative of his estate over the
objections of his surviving sister. After some estate funds were misappropriated by one of the deceased’s cousin,
the Magistrate appointed an attorney to administer the estate and distribute the assets according to customary law.
The remaining assets in the estate were awarded to the other male cousin determined to be the only heir to the estate.
Shibi was precluded from being the heir to the estate of her deceased brother in terms of the legislation governing
African intestate succession.
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In the Bhe case, the applicant (Bhe) brought an action on behalf of her two minor daughters, the
interest of all female descendants, descendants other than the eldest male descendants and extra-marital
children who are descendants of people who die intestate subject to “Black law,” and the public
interest.316 Upon the death of Bhe’s spouse, the Magistrate of Khayelitsha appointed the father of the
deceased as representative of his estate. A material factual dispute arose as to whether Bhe’s children
were extra-marital, while both Bhe and the deceased’s father agreed that no formal marriage or customary
union had taken place, the deceased’s father insisted that the deceased had paid lobolo which Bhe denied.
From 1990 until the deceased’s death, Bhe and the deceased lived together and maintained a household,
he was a carpenter and she worked as a domestic. They lived in a temporary informal settlement in the
Khayelitsha township near Cape Town.
Prior to his death, the deceased secured a state housing subsidy which he used to purchase the
property on which they lived as well as building materials for a house, but he died before the house was
completed. His income had supported Bhe and their two dependent children. His disputed estate
comprised the temporary informal shelter and the property on which it was situated, various items of
movable property that he and Bhe had jointly acquired over the years, and the building materials for the
home they intended to build. After the death of her spouse, Bhe’s relationship with his father
“deteriorated to the point of acrimony.” Despite the fact that the deceased father lived on the other side of
the country, he was appointed the sole heir to the estate by the magistrate pursuant to legislation
governing intestate succession among Blacks and “Black law and custom.” When the deceased’s father
indicated his intention to sell all the property to defray funeral expenses, Bhe challenged the appointment
of the deceased’s father as heir and representative of the estate fearing homelessness for herself and her
two minor children.
Bhe sought relief from the Constitutional Court, claiming that provisions of the statutes governing
intestate succession in South Africa317 should be declared unconstitutional and invalid because they
conflict with the Constitution’s equality, dignity and children’s rights provisions. The Court agreed,
finding customary laws governing succession incompatible with the Bill of Rights. It rejected the
argument that such laws should nonetheless survive scrutiny because they give recognition and effect to
custom.318 The Court held that the customary rule of male primogeniture violated the rights of women to
equal treatment and was an affront to their dignity, but not before explaining the importance of custom in
law and society. The Court acknowledged that “the impact of the [challenged] provisions falls mainly on
African women and children, regarded as arguably the most vulnerable groups in our society.”319 Yet it
also affirmed that “certain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt that our basic law
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Bhe para 10. The women’s legal centre trust together with the Commission for Gender Equality submitted
amicus briefs in the action.
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See Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Section 23 of the
Intestate Succession Act provides in pertinent part: “All moveable property belonging to a Black and allotted by
him or accruing under Black law or custom to any woman with whom he lived in a customary union, or to any
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legacy of discrimination against black women in South Africa see Adrien Wing & Eunice P. de Carvalho, Black
South African Women: Toward Equal Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1995).
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Bhe para 72( “the rights to equality and dignity are the most valuable of rights in any open and democratic
state. They assume a special importance in South Africa because of our past history of inequality and hurtful
discrimination.” )
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specifically requires that customary law should be accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South
African law.”320
Writing for the Court, Justice Langa explained that customary law was not insulated from change,
amendment or adjustment. Indeed, he opined that adjustments and development to bring customary law
provisions in line with the Constitution or into accord with the spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of
Rights are required.321 Affirming the role of customary law in South African society, he noted that
constructive and positive aspects of customary law had too long been neglected:
The inherent flexibility of the system is but one of its constructive facets. Customary law places
much store in consensus-seeking and naturally provides for family and clan meetings which
offer excellent opportunities for the prevention and resolution of disputes or disagreements.
Nor are these aspects useful only in the area of disputes. They provide a setting which
contributes to the unity of family structures and the fostering of cooperation, a sense of
responsibility in and of belonging to its members, as well as the nurturing of healthy
communitarian traditions such as ubuntu.322
Yet the Court rejected arguments that male primogeniture should be preserved out of respect for
culture on the grounds that the dominant purpose of the rules did not give effect to the goals of respecting
culture and pluralism. Rather, the court concluded that the effect of the succession rules had been to
“ossify customary law” in furtherance of the purpose of a racist program of entrenching division and
subordination. The Court deemed male primogeniture “a relic of a racist past,” because as codified it
imposed a system on all Black Africans “irrespective of their circumstances and inclinations.”323
The Court offered guidance in assessing whether a rule of customary law should be upheld or
invalidated: “a critical issue in any constitutional litigation about customary law will therefore be the
question whether a particular rule is a mythical stereotype which has become ossified in the official code,
or whether it continues to enjoy social currency.”324 Accordingly, “it is important to examine the context
in which the rules of customary law . . . operated and the kind of society served by them.”325 The Court
explained that rules of customary law do not operate in isolation; rather they were part of a system which
conformed to the community’s way of life and had its own safeguards to ensure fairness in the context of
entitlements, duties and responsibilities.326
Examining the history and context of the male primogeniture practice, the Court found that
customary succession rules functioned to preserve and perpetuate the family unit; the heir did not merely
succeed to the assets of the deceased, nor was succession primarily concerned only with the distribution
320
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of the estate of the deceased. Property was collectively owned and the head of the family administered it
for the benefit of the family unit as a whole. To that end, customary rules provided that the heir served to
step into the shoes of the family head and in so doing assumed not only all the rights of the deceased but
also the obligations of the family head and acquired the duty to maintain and support all remaining
members of the family who were assured his protection. An heir inherited the property of the deceased
only in the sense that he assumed control and administration of the property subject to his obligations as
head of the family unit. In short, “the rules of customary law of succession were consequently mainly
concerned with succession to the position and status of the deceased family head rather than the
distribution of his personal assets.”327
This context has over time changed, the Court observed: “[m]odern urban communities and families
are structured and organized differently and no longer purely along traditional lines. The customary law
rules of succession simply determine succession to the deceased’s estate without the accompanying social
implications which they traditionally had.”328 The Court noted that nuclear families have largely replaced
traditional extended families; the male heirs now often simply acquires the estate without assuming, or
even being in a position to assume any of the deceased’s responsibilities. Accordingly, the Court found:
“In the changed circumstances, therefore, the succession of the heir to the assets of the deceased does not
necessarily correspond in practice with an enforceable responsibility to provide support and maintenance
to the family and dependants of the deceased.”
Customary law, the Court concluded, had not kept pace with how people live: “indigenous law is not
a fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules. By its very nature it evolves as the
people who live by its norms change their patterns of life . . . it has evolved and developed to meet the
changing needs of the community.”329 In this instance, rules of succession in customary law “have over
time become increasingly out of step with the real values and circumstances of the societies they are
meant to serve and particularly the people who live in urban areas.”330 For Justice Langa, it was clear that
the application of customary law rules of succession in circumstances vastly different from their
traditional setting causes much hardship. Trends reflect that a basic social need to sustain the surviving
family unit rather than a general adherence to male primogeniture should be paramount.331
Based on this understanding of the role of custom in the constitutional system as necessarily open to
growth and adaptation, the Court concluded that the limitations primogeniture placed on the rights of
those subject to it were not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society founded on the
327
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values of equality, human dignity and freedom. Because primogeniture precludes widows from inheriting
from their late husbands; daughters from inheriting from their parents, younger sons from inheriting from
their parents and extra-marital children from inheriting from their fathers; the Court concluded it was, “a
form of discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable group,
exacerbated by old notions of patriarch and male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality
under this constitutional order.”332 Further, the court determined that the principle of primogeniture also
violates the right of women to human dignity as guaranteed in the Constitution in the sense that implies
that women are not fit or competent to own and administer property.
What is particularly noteworthy about Bhe is that the Court does not present customary and
constitutional law as inherently necessarily in conflict—rather customary law is not what is written but
what is lived. The Constitutional Court took a historical time honored tradition and examined it in the
present context; for this Court, customary law is not ahistorical or abstract but experienced. In short,
customary law is not treated as tantamount to the law of gravity.
Also worthy of note is the Court’s pragmatic approach to pluralism that examines the purpose of a
given customary practice. The Court is pragmatic in its approach but still expresses appreciation for
values of pluralism and diversity. In questions of custom and culture, the Court has now demonstrated its
willingness to be pragmatic. As a normative matter, pragmatists take all truth to be experiential. This does
not deny the existence of truth, as does the cultural relativist, but rather holds that truth is discovered by
experience. Our experiences differ due to our differences which influence how we experience the world
and how the world experiences us. The pragmatist position looks to real world consequences and
empirical insights in proposing solutions. The pragmatist judge then employs empirical means to reach
consequentalist ends and remains open to examining experiences to shed light on possible problems. The
pragmatist judge wants to know what is at stake in a practical sense when deciding one way or another.333
At stake in the maintenance of the custom of male primogeniture was whether or not to render
African women and children, among the most vulnerable in South African society, more vulnerable. The
pragmatist judge is also anti-essentialist because the emphasis is on consequences not concepts, and
results are justified contextually. Here, Justice Langa’s justifications in striking down male primogeniture
were contextual and expressed concern for the new economic activity of women, different forms of
household arrangements and changing values concerning gender roles.
In the pluralistic legal setting, normative orders, including international and constitutional rights as
well as customary institutions, present both opportunities and challenges in the struggle for gender
equality. Proponents of gender equality must appropriate positive openings presented by cultural and
religious traditions, instead of dismissing culture as a negative influence.334 What may appear as “ad hoc,”
the typical criticism leveled against pragmatism, is more properly seen as an opportunity for adaptation.
Both pluralism and pragmatism require contextualization, Justice Langa’s opinion in Bhe appreciates
that context informs the meaning of cultural practice and customary law and meanings change over time
adaptation occurs. Significantly, the Bhe case situates rights in the context of the associated corollary
responsibilities that were customary. Because changes in society and in the status of women have served
to disassociate responsibilities from rights, the claim of a customary right is less compelling. Yet, the
Court would appear to find compelling the further development of norms of customary responsibility
332
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given its emphasis on the communitarian features of customary law and its counsel to lower courts to
consider the context in which rules operate and the kind of society rules serve when assessing whether or
not to enforce them.
2. The Fourie Case: The Evolution of Constitutional Rights
The Constitutional Court has also determined that constitutional rights are flexible and adaptable.
This is evidenced in its holdings concerning same-sex marriage. The combined cases of Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fourie and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs (the Fourie Case)
reflect the flexibility of rights.335
In Fourie, Marie Adriaana Fourie and Cecilia Bonthuys claimed that they were unconstitutionally
prevented from getting married. The case was a facial challenge to the Marriage Act of 1961 claiming
that the act unconstitutionally deprived gays and lesbian of the right to marry. The Court concluded that
“the failure of the common law and Marriage Act to provide the means whereby same-sex couples can
enjoy the same status, entitlements, and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through
marriage, constitutes an unjustifiable violation of their right to equal protection of the law under section
9(1) and not to be discriminated against unfairly in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution.”336
The State argued that under the U.N. Human Rights Committee existing interpretations of Article 23
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which recognizes the right to marry
and found a family, South Africa did not necessarily need to extend marriage to same-sex couples. The
Court responded that the reference in Article 23 to “men and women” was “descriptive of an assumed
reality, rather than prescriptive of a normative structure for all time.”337
The Court observed that while both the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state
that the “family is the natural and fundamental group unit in society,”338 neither attempts to define the
family.339 The Court further stated:
Nor need it [the family] by its nature be restricted, inexorably and forever to heterosexual
family units. There is nothing in the international law instruments to suggest that the family . . .
be constituted according to any particular model . . . Indeed, rights by their nature will atrophy
if they are frozen. As conditions of humanity alter and as ideas of justice and equity evolve, so
do concepts of rights take on new texture and meaning. The horizon of rights is as limitless as
the hopes and expectations of humanity. What was regarded by the law as just yesterday is
condemned as unjust today.340
335
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As the Bhe and Fourie cases demonstrate, while the question of universalism in human rights defies
easy resolution, South Africa’s legal culture is one of compromise and negotiation. The South African
legal system, with its incorporation of international human rights law is well equipped to construct a
flexible position between the oppositional absolutes of universalism and relativism. Stakeholders in the
debates that frames gender equality and cultural autonomy as oppositional and necessitating a choice
between abolition and accommodation would gain from working pragmatically to identify possible
avenues by which to adapt, adjust, and modify norms in ways that enhance the likelihood that both
cultural practices and human rights advocacy will contribute to solutions to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
C. A Capabilities Approach to the Problems
Presented by Virginity Testing
Evading the task of finding the best grounding for human rights, in the face of philosophical
skeptics and political opponents, demonstrates a lack of intellectual responsibility.341
Michael Freeman
As a case study, virginity testing highlights the need for a more comprehensive framework in human
rights discourse for resolving competing gender equality and cultural autonomy rights claims and to
ground socioeconomic rights. The “capabilities approach” offers an alternative conceptual framework
that has great potential for strengthening the normative foundations of human rights theory and informing
the practice of human rights advocacy. Because capabilities theory explicitly acknowledges the
significance of context, it better accounts for cultural differences and therefore responds to one of the
primary criticisms of a rigid universal rights approach. Accordingly, capabilities theory may provide a
pragmatically productive way for mediating between gender equality and cultural autonomy when
confronted by particular problems, such as virginity testing, which at first appears to present conflicts
between and among particular rights. A capabilities approach would advance stakeholders towards
finding new ways to address HIV/AIDS and its disproportionate impact on young women and girls in
South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. The primary contribution of a capabilities approach is its
potential to ground human rights discourse and advocacy in a way that addresses the issues associated
with virginity testing by expands the domain of concern beyond formal legal entitlements to actual
freedoms. In this way, a capabilities approach offers some promise for bridging the divides that have
emerged in human rights theory and practice.
A. The Capabilities Approach
Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen developed the capabilities approach because he perceived
that mainstream development economics had failed to accurately assess the individual well-being that the
development branch of economics purports to measure.342 For Sen, the then existing literature on
inequality in economics with its exclusive focus on certain factors, but not others tended to assume away
ambiguities and complexities such that in his view “the most blatant forms of inequality and exploitation
341
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survive in the world” due to the limitations of utilitarianism which “overlooks everything other than total
utility—aggregated over different types of utilities and different persons.”343
Sen argued that development economics should examine deprivation using a different metric than the
then prevailing approaches which looked to utility or satisfaction. Instead of utility or satisfaction, Sen
advanced “the metric of capabilities to function” as an alternative. This approach would involve “using
information regarding who can in fact do what and not just the way people desire or react to their ability
or disability to do these things”344 in order to measure the presence or absence of inequality.
Sen reformulated the framework traditionally used in microeconomics by suggesting that to truly
understand how individuals obtain or fail to obtain well-being policy makers should focus on the true
freedom people actually have for leading a valuable life. Under this view, in making or assessing various
public policy choices or devising economic development policies, attention should be paid to people’s
capabilities to do and to engage in certain activities and to enjoy positive states of being; policy makers
must seek to assess an individual’s well-being and her freedom to pursue well-being. Accordingly, policy
development is reoriented towards a “concentration on freedoms to achieve in general and the capabilities
to function in particular.”345
The two basic elements of Sen’s capability approach are “functionings” and “capabilities.” Sen
explains that functionings are the “beings and doings” of a person, while a person’s capabilities are “the
various combinations of functions that a person can achieve . . . reflecting the person’s freedom to lead
one type of life or another.”346 Put simply, “a functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the
ability to achieve.” For Sen, functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since
they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are people’s potential
functionings and may include such things as being well-nourished, being sheltered, being healthy, being
able to participate in a community and working in the labor market. All capabilities together correspond
to the overall freedom to lead the life that a person has reason to value.347
To illustrate this point, Sen offers a hypothetical, adapted here, which compares two individuals who
are starving. Imagine individual A is an internally displaced victim of famine in North Korea, while
individual B has decided to go on a hunger strike in front of the White House to protest the war in Iraq.
Although both A and B lack the function of being well-nourished, the freedom of each of them to avoid
starving to death is critically different. A capabilities inquiry captures this difference because it directs us
to consider the positive freedom and real opportunity to create a particular lifestyle an individual would
have reason to enjoy. From this vantage point, a capabilities approach enables us to make a meaningful
distinction with respect to the difference between the functionings that each individual could have
achieved. While both A and B may presently lack the achieved function of being well-nourished, the
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political protester B easily has a capability to achieve such a functioning while the North Korean famine
victim A does not.
As illustrated, the capabilities approach appreciates that the means to achieve are often dictated by
personal, social and environmental factors which in turn influence an individual’s freedom to achieve. As
such, actual achievements are directly related to capabilities which will depend heavily on external choice
constraints as well as different ideas of the good life. In Sen’s view, people should have capabilities and
freedoms to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and be or become the
person they want to be in life. Once they have these basic freedoms they can choose to act on those
freedoms in line with their own ideas of the kind of life they want to live. Thus, the capabilities approach
respects different choices and conceptions of a good life. For example, “every person should have the
opportunity to be part of a community and to practice religion, but if someone prefers to be a hermit or an
atheist, they should also have this option.”348
For Sen, the capability to function is the thing that comes closest to the notion of “positive freedom.”
A concentration on securing capabilities means eliminating vulnerabilities and enabling empowerment
and liberty. According to Sen, “the issue of gender inequality is ultimately one of disparate freedoms.”
To be positively free is to be able to live as one chooses to have the effective power to achieve chosen
results. Too often, this freedom is not available to women and girls in matters of equality, sexual
autonomy and privacy.
A good society viewed from the perspective of Sen’s capabilities approach would provide the
material and institutional conditions for both well-being and agency freedom. It follows that good
governments, through recognizing the rights to education and health should strive to facilitate the
formation of good capabilities and remove impediments to their exercise and provide the means for their
use. A broad well-being assessment measure of the kind Sen advocates in his Capabilities approach
permits simultaneous appreciation of vital roles in process of economic development of many different
institutions, including markets, governments, political parties, civic institutions, educational arrangements
and opportunities of open dialog and debate.349
Finally, Sen maintains that there is an empirical connection that links freedoms of different kinds.
For example, where political freedoms are present in the form of free expressions and democratic
elections, economic security is promoted. Social opportunities in the form of education and health
facilitates economic participation. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen and reinforce one another.
It would also follow that lack of certain freedoms diminishes other freedoms.
Virginity testing has reemerged because South Africans do not, as yet, enjoy the capability to be free
from disease. The controversy surrounding the practice of testing became polarized, in part, because the
theoretical foundation of human rights universalism has proved impoverished when confronted by the
empirical realities of cultural difference in the disease context.
B. The Contributions of a Capabilities Conceptual Framework
How might capabilities theory assist policy makers and stakeholders better engage with the politics
of pluralism in the context of HIV/AIDS? Capabilities theory may enhance human rights theory,
advocacy and discourse by enabling a richer consideration of problems that the human rights conversation
to date has not taken full account of for a variety of reasons. In addition to offering an alternative
348
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conceptual framework for assessing inequality, Sen’s capabilities approach offers a practical strategy for
evaluating public policy. The capabilities approach evaluates policies according to their impact on
people’s capabilities: “[i]t asks whether people are being healthy and whether the resources necessary for
this capability, such as clean water, access to medical doctors, protection from infections and diseases and
basic knowledge on health issues are present. It asks whether people are well nourished and whether the
conditions for this capability, such as sufficient food supply and food entitlements are met.”350 The
success of a society is to be evaluated by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy.
Feminist economists have embraced capabilities because of its enormous potential for addressing
feminist concerns and questions such as reproductive health, voting rights, political power, domestic
violence, education and women’s social status which are not dependent solely on financial status.351
Human rights theorists and advocates should also find reason to embrace capabilities theory. It would
enrich the discourse on how human rights law can best address cultural diversity, legal pluralism, and
socio-economic rights as they are presented in the instance of the virginity testing resurgence in the
context of pandemic disease.
For both theorists and practitioners in human rights law, the capabilities approach offers two
significant contributions to enable better engagement with the politics of cultural pluralism and
socioeconomic rights. Indeed when human rights arguments are grounded in a capabilities perspective,
the virginity testing problem is defined and resolved differently and more constructively.
The first contribution of the capability approach is that it explicitly acknowledges human diversity,
such as race, age, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and geographical location as well as whether people are
handicapped, pregnant or have caring responsibilities. The capabilities approach does not proceed from
some formal fiction of sameness, it actually attempts to account for difference. Sen criticized earlier
inequality approaches in economics that assume that “all people have the same utility functions or are
influenced in the same way and to the same extent by the same personal, social and environmental
characteristics.”352 The social and environmental conversion factors appreciated by his capabilities
approach allows policy makers to take into account a number of societal features, such as social norms
and discriminatory practices which may impede an individual’s capability to function.
Under this view, cultural practices are not immediately banned or condemned out of hand for being
illiberal or unconstitutional, rather, one looks to whether capabilities are enhanced or diminished by a
given practice. It follows that practices may be open to adaptation to enhance capabilities. Capabilities
theory thus complements the pragmatic judicial analysis applied to the question of customary law by the
Constitutional Court which privileged consideration of context and the actual effects a rule would have on
the potential functionings of individuals.
Again, the capabilities approach would ameliorate concerns by Third World Feminists that too often
culture is condemned as oppressive rather than as providing an opportunity for women’s empowerment.
Under a rights challenge to the practice of virginity testing informed by capabilities theory, the measure
of inequality, repression of sexual autonomy and violation of privacy would be assessed in terms of how
the practice enhances capabilities and fuctionings. Liberal universalism’s normative commitments more
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readily call for abolition and condemnation and cannot as easily capitalize on the opportunities that may
exist in a given customary normative framework for advancing women’s empowerment.
Related to the potential of capabilities to acknowledge diversity is its “underspecified character”
which allows the approach to accommodate heterogeneity or different ways of resolving issues
surrounding cultural practices so long as the practice is capability enhancing. It is precisely because:
The capability[ies] approach is a framework of thought, a normative tool, but it is not a fully
specified theory that gives us complete answers to all our normative questions. It is not a
mathematical algorithm that prescribes how to measure inequality or poverty, nor is it a theory
of justice. The capability approach, strictly speaking, only advocates that the evaluative space
should be that of capabilities.353
Accordingly, a capabilities approach allows for flexibility and is not subject to being rigid and
absolute in the sense that rights too often are. Rigid thinking about culture and rights shaped the debate
over virginity testing and limited the domain of concern and in so doing also may have limited creativity
over compromises and alternative solutions. When the problems associated with virginity testing were
framed as gender equality rights and cultural autonomy rights in conflict, stakeholders were also rendered
blind to the underlying motivation to resume testing which was the compromised ability of girls and
women to be from disease and premature death. Because capabilities theory is flexible in its outlook it
avoids this fate.
The second important aspect of Sen’s capability approach is its appreciation of positive freedom and
the interrelationship between and among freedoms as they influence the exercise of capabilities and
functionings. Under this view, the focus of stakeholders in the virginity testing controversy is shifted to
changing the material and institutional conditions that give rise to the practice in the first instance—
disparate capabilities to be free from disease and death. Pragmatically, capabilities theory counsels that
virginity testing could be eliminated by increasing the capabilities of women and girls to become more
secure from HIV/AIDS infection.
Moreover, Sen’s emphasis on positive freedom could help secure a theoretical foundation for a
substantive and meaningful right to health as well as other underdeveloped social and economic rights
enshrined in the ICESCR and the South African Constitution.354 Because the capabilities approach calls
for the creation of the background material and institutional conditions necessary for developing the
capabilities to function as a healthy individual, it might inform considerations of the reasonableness of a
given policy course in realizing the right to health and promoting HIV/AIDS eradication.
Stakeholders in the virginity testing controversy could carry forward conversations about the content
of the right to health and the affirmative obligations of government to create the material and institutional
conditions to enable women greater freedom from disease in the course of discussions to develop
regulatory guidelines to govern testing for those over 16 years of age. At minimum, such a right would
include accurate education and information about HIV/AIDS transmission.
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Stakeholders in the virginity testing debate share a common concern for girls’ welfare but are
distracted by their differences. Capabilities theory links their divergent normative commitments through
its focus on positive freedoms. This perspective has the potential to strengthen conceptions of the
substantive content of the minimum core of a right to health or could inform judicial evaluations of the
reasonableness of a given government initiative or omission with respect to public health. Capabilities
theory as an alternative normative grounding for human rights discourse can assist in moving the debate
away from polarizing positions. Because capabilities theory is concerned with what girls can be and do, it
creates more space for common ground between both parties to the testing debate and appreciates
pluralism. Concerns about what the future generations of South African youth will be able to become and
able to accomplish is at least one concern shared by traditionalists and feminists alike. A joint solution
crafted with a view towards expanding the capabilities of South African youth will have more legitimacy
than a legislative ban on a popular cultural practice. Reconciliation of stakeholder divisions may also be
found in a greater focus on the further development of a substantive right to health. South Africa’s legal
culture is designed for mediation and adaptation as evidenced by the Constitutional Court’s recent
decisions on gender equality and cultural rights. A capabilities approach would be consistent with such
emerging jurisprudence.
So, reconsidering the problems presented by the virginity testing controversy for human rights
discourse from the perspective of a health right analysis informed by capabilities, the rights issues are not
only equality, sexual autonomy, privacy and culture; it is also and primarily freedom to develop
capabilities to function. The relevant inquiry is whether women are reasonably secure from disease and
premature death and if not, why not? What are the impediments to their capabilities to avoid premature
death from disease? What is virginity testing doing to further the capabilities and functionings of those
engaged in it?
If instead of classical liberalism, the central foundation for human rights were capabilities, the
distinction between universalism and relativism would collapse because the focus allows for choices and
differences so long as capabilities are increased and freedom is enlarged. Similarly, the sharp distinctions
drawn between civil and political rights versus socioeconomic rights would dissipate because a greater
emphasis would be placed on the material and institutional conditions that may be the sources of
impediments to freedoms to develop capabilities and choose different functionings. Where liberal rights
to equality and autonomy in the abstract do not tell us how to resolve particular questions or decide
between conflicting claims of rights, capabilities can mediate across pluralism and inform how best to
balance conflicting rights by looking to capability enhancement. In considering challenges to human
rights from culture based arguments, a capabilities approach encourages consideration of a more holistic
understanding of the context in which cultural practices are embedded.
By their very nature, normative orders evolve as the people who live by them change their patterns
of life. HIV/AIDS is changing the pattern of life in many places in the world. Law and culture must
evolve and adapt to meet the changing needs of affected communities. In the disease context balances
often are not struck in favor of rights. A human rights regime grounded in capabilities concerns would be
better able to account for and cope with the coming changes. Current legislative approaches to the
connections between culture, disease and gender inequality would be greatly enhanced by taking more
seriously the community, social, material and institutional factors that the capabilities approach
encompasses.
VI. CONCLUSION

57

58

LAW JOURNAL

[GEORGE

In the context of HIV/AIDS vulnerability to the epidemic has been associated with the extent of
realization of human rights. For as the HIV epidemic matures and evolves within each
community and country, it focuses inexorably on those groups who before HIV/AIDS arrived,
were already discriminated against, marginalized, and stigmatized within each society.355
Jonathan Mann
Human rights advocates need to understand the process of cultural legitimization and change within
a particular political context and the disease context. Virginity testing is perhaps less a question of age-old
tradition, than more one of current politics wrought in large part by the continued failure of the South
African government and the international community to meet health obligations. Going forward all
stakeholders in the virginity testing debate must be united in finding common cause in the social context
of a disease that disproportionately impacts young women and girls. More likely than not stakeholders
will find that the testing ban will not stop testing, and testing will likely not stop AIDS. While it will be
next to impossible to rigorously enforce a testing ban, education is possible and a viable option.
Stakeholders must mobilize and demand that the South African government and the international
community meet obligations to realize the right to health and protect the health of the public.
The virginity testing controversy in South Africa highlights the way in which the contemporary
human rights legal regime presents a paradox. On one hand it consists of a well established set of
international standards, but on the other hand these standards have not been sufficiently theoretically
grounded and so remain vulnerable to challenge by competing normative orders set by local cultures.
Indeed, human rights law raises problems that are practical and urgent as well as theoretical and abstract.
This article has offered a pragmatic approach to address the practical problems of cultural pluralism in
diverse developing countries. It has also advanced capabilities theory as a way to address the theoretical
difficulty socioeconomic rights present to human rights discourse. It is hoped that these strategies will
assist those in South Africa and beyond who are concerned with gender equality and cultural preservation
to identify areas of common interest and imagine a variety of ways of resolving conflicts between their
positions by appreciating the richness of the resources rights and culture can provide in the AIDS crisis.
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